


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
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
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
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PREFACE.

The present publication is intended to serve as an addendum and a supplement to the documents giving the history of the war of 1914 published in the austro-hungarian Red Book.

The documents here published give the exact text of the originals.

The first part (I.) contains the diplomatic documents between the 28th June and the 23rd July 1914; the sequel (II. and III.) will contain a series of documents up to the 27th August 1914.

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1.

Autograph letter from Emperor and King Francis Joseph to Emperor William*).

I regretted sincerely, that you were obliged to give up your intention of coming to Vienna for the funeral ceremony. I should have very much[?] liked to personally express my heartfelt thanks for your sympathy in my great grief.

By your warmhearted condolence you have given me a fresh proof that in you I possess a true and reliable friend whom I can trust in every trying hour.

I should have much wished to speak to you about the political situation, as this has not been possible I take the liberty to send you the enclosed memoir of my Minister of Foreign Affairs, written before the terrible catastrophe of Sarajewo, and more worthy of consideration, now that this tragic event has happened**).

The crime committed against my nephew is the direct consequence of the agitation carried on by Russian and Servian Panславists, whose sole aim is to weaken the Triple Alliance and shatter my Empire.

The researches made up to the present have shown that the bloody deed of Sarajevo is not the work of a single individual but the result of a well-organised plot, the threads of which reach to Belgrade, and though it may be impossible to prove the complicity of the Servian government, there can be no doubt whatever that this governments policy, intent as it is to unite all South-slavs under the servian flag, must encourage such crimes and that if it is not stopped, it will prove a lasting danger to my house and to my countries.

*) From draught dated Vienna, July 2, 1914, of autograph letter presented in Berlin, July 5, 1914 by the Austro-hungarian ambassador; Emperor William's answer will be found No. 18.

**) Vide supplement to No. 1.

This danger is increased by the fact that Roumania, though it is allied to us, entertains intimate bonds of friendship with Serbia and tolerates the same hateful agitation within its realm as Serbia does.

I find it difficult to doubt the faith and the good intentions of such an old friend as King Charles of Roumania; but he has within the two last months twice declared to my minister in Bucharest, that in view of the excited and hostile sentiments of his people he would, if serious events arose, find it impossible to do his duty as an ally.

At the same time the present Roumanian government is openly encouraging the aims of the league of culture; it favours the approachment of Serbia and is trying to found a new Balkan league, which cannot but be directed against my Empire.

In the beginning of the reign of Charles similar political fancies, as those which the Culture League is spreading abroad just now, troubled the healthy minds of roumanian statesmen and the danger threatened, that the kingdom was about to launch on an adventurous course of politics. At that time your late grandfather interfered in an energetic manner and, hitting the mark, through his government showed Roumania the only way in which it could attain a favoured position in Europe, and become a reliable support of order.

Now the kingdom is threatened by the same danger; I fear that merely giving good advice will be of no avail and that Roumania can only be rescued for the Triple Alliance, if we make it impossible for a Balkan league to be founded under the patronage of Russia, by gaining Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance and making Bucharest understand clearly that the friends of Serbia cannot be our friends, and that Roumania must not look to us as allies, if it does not break with Serbia and does not at the same time stop the agitation directed against my Empire in Roumania.

My governments efforts must in future be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing its size. The first step on this road would be the strengthening of the present Bulgarian government, so that Bulgaria, whose real interests tally with ours, would not be tempted to turn to its old love for Russia.

If Bucharest finds out that the Triple Alliance is resolved not to renounce friendship with Bulgaria, but is prepared to cause Bulgaria to make friends with Roumania and guarantee its integrity, it is possible that Roumania will abandon the dangerous road into which the friendship with Servia has led it and the approaching of Russia has tempted it. If we succeed in this, we might make the attempt to reconcile Greece with Bulgaria and Turkey. A new Balkan league could then be formed under the patronage of the Triple Alliance, whose aim would be to stop the progress of the panslavist flood and ensure lasting peace for our countries. This will not be otherwise possible, but by pushing aside Servia and preventing it from becoming a factor of power in the Balkans, as it is at present the cornerstone of panslavist politics.

After the recent terrible event in Bosnia, I am certain that you also are convinced, that a conciliation between Servia and us is out of the question and that the peace-loving policy of all European monarchs is threatened, while this centre of criminal agitation continues unpunished in Belgrade.

Supplement.

Memoir.

At the end of the great political convulsions of the last two years, the situation of the Balkans cleared up sufficiently to allow us to judge in some degree of the results of the crisis and to ascertain how much the interests of the Triple Alliance have been involved, especially those of the two central imperial powers and what consequences may be drawn for the European and the Balkan politics of these powers.

If we compare the present situation impartially with the situation before the crisis, we must admit that the total result cannot be judged favorably either from the point of view of Austria-Hungary or of that of the Triple Alliance.

Some favorable points may certainly be observed. It has been possible to balance the advance of Servia by the creation of an independent Albanian state, which will after a number of years, when its internal organisation is completed, serve as a military factor in the accounts of the Triple Alliance. The relations of the Triple Alliance with the Greek kingdom, which

has gained in size and importance, have become such, that Greece, notwithstanding its alliance with Servia need not be regarded in the light of a decided enemy.

What is of more importance is, that the development, which has led to the second Balkan war has caused Bulgaria to awake from its hypnotic Russian dream, and that it need no longer be regarded in the light of an exponent of Russias policy. The Bulgarian government seems on the contrary to be anxious to enter into close relations with the Triple Alliance.

These favorable instances are outweighed by a number of disadvantages. Turkey, whose interests tallied with those of the Triple Alliance, and which weighed heavily in the balance against Russia and the Balkan countries, has been almost entirely driven out of Europe, and has suffered considerably in its *prestige* as a Great Power. Servia, whose policy has for many years been hostile towards Austria-Hungary and stands entirely under Russian influence, has gained both in population and in territory, much more than it ever expected. Its territorial neighbourhood to Montenegro and the visible growth of the idea of a Greater Servia makes an aggrandisement achieved by a union with Montenegro seem a not unlikely event. And last, not least, the relations of Roumania with the Triple Alliance have undergone a considerable change in the course of the crisis.

Whilst the Balkan crisis has brought about results, which are in themselves unfavorable to the Triple Alliance, and which bear the germ of further developments, that must be undesirable to Austria-Hungary, we observe on the other hand that Russian and French diplomacy have launched upon a course, which aims at improving the advantages obtained and modifying the results of what is to their disadvantage.

A brief survey of the european situation will explain why the Triple Entente—or we should rather say the Double Entente, since England has for obvious' reasons adopted a reserved attitude—could not be satisfied with the changes brought about in the Balkans in its favour. The policy of the two Empires and to a certain degree that of Italy is conservative and the character of the Triple Alliance is purely defensive. The policy of Russia and also that of France has

a tendency to bring about certain changes, and the alliance between Russia and France, being the result of these parallel tendencies, must in its last consequences be of an offensive nature. If the policy of the Triple Alliance has hitherto triumphed and Europe's peace has not been disturbed by Russia and France, this is entirely due to the military superiority of the armies of the Triple Alliance, especially of those of Austria-Hungary and Germany, when compared to those of Russia and France. The alliance with Roumania being also considered an important factor.

The idea of liberating the christian Balkan peoples from the yoke of Turkey with a view towards using them as a weapon against the Triple Alliance has always been the true reason of the traditional interest shown by Russia towards these peoples. In Russia this idea developed to the wish-appreciated and seconded by France, of reuniting all the Balkan states into a Balkan league, which would have put an end to the military superiority of the Triple Alliance. The first condition for the realisation of this plan was to exclude Turkey from the territory inhabited by the christian Balkan peoples, so as to increase the latter's importance and give them full freedom towards the West. The last war has in a general way realised this condition. But on the other hand the war caused a division of the Balkan states, which now stand against each other in two equally strong opposing groups, Turkey and Bulgaria on one side, the two Servian states, Greece and Roumania on the other.

The next task, which Russia wished to accomplish with the aid of France, was to annul this division, or at least to change its proportions, so as to obtain the greater number of Balkan states when the European forces are measured against each other.

As Servia and Greece had already concluded an alliance and Roumania was in harmony with them, at least as far as the peace of Bucharest was concerned, the two allied powers in the West were anxious to remove the rancour which exists between Bulgaria and Greece and more still between Bulgaria and Servia on account of Macedonia; overmore to find a basis on which it would be possible to draw Roumania over to the

side of the Entente, and if possible to overcome Bulgarias distrustful attitude and enter into some political combination with it, lastly to bring about a peaceful solution of the question of the islands, that would induce Turkey to approach the Balkan states, perhaps even to join them.

There can be no doubt as to the basis upon which Russian and French diplomacy intends bringing about the adjustment of all this opposition and rivalry and forming a new Balkan league. A league of the Balkan states, now that Turkey is no longer in question, must be founded on a programme directed against Austria-Hungary, at the expense of whose territorial integrity the members of the league might be promised an advance of their frontiers toward the West. It is scarcely possible to imagine any other basis for a Balkan league; the basis as above mentioned, is by no means out of question and even on the way to become a fact.

There can be no doubt that Servia, compelled by Russia, would consent to an alliance with Bulgaria, directed against Austria-Hungary, the result of which would be the acquisition of Bosnia and the surrounding country, even if the price that has to be paid were Macedonia.

There are greater difficulties to be overcome in Sofia.

Russia has made propositions to Bulgaria on this basis before the second Balkan war and has repeated them after the peace of Bucharest. Bulgaria, which does not trust agreements with Servia, has refused to comply with the plans of Russia, and is following a course of politics, which promises anything rather than a peaceful understanding with Servia under the patronage of Russia. But in Petersburg the game has not been given up as lost. In the interior of Bulgaria Russian agents are busy undermining the present system, and the diplomacy of the two allied powers is hard at work to bring about the complete isolation of Bulgaria with a view to making it more pliable to the wishes of Russia.

Since Bulgaria after the war sought to approach Turkey and succeeded in doing so, and since the Porte shows an inclination to ally itself to Bulgaria and to approach the Triple Alliance, Russian and French influence is busy on the Bosphorus to oppose this policy of Turkey, with whom it is

trying to make friends, hoping either to isolate Bulgaria completely, or else to induce it to take a different course with the help of Turkey. There are reports from Constantinople, which are to a certain degree confirmed by the journey of Talaat Bey to Livadia, that these efforts have not been without success, at least as far as Turkey is concerned. Russia has succeeded in deviating the historical distrust of Turkey from itself, by calling attention to the alleged intentions of other powers threatening the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor. France has given its support, inasmuch as it drew advantage from Turkey's financial difficulties and the result was, that instead of approaching the Triple Alliance, the Statesmen of Turkey gave serious consideration to joining the opposed set of powers.

Talaat Bey's journey to Bucharest was also the result of the activity of Russian and French diplomats, who brought about Roumanian mediation in the question of the islands and encouraged friendly relations between Bucharest and Constantinople with a view towards furthering the detachment of Bulgaria. Up to the present the policy of isolating Bulgaria has not borne visible fruits, perhaps because there has as yet been no reason why Sofia should distrust the intentions of Turkey. Still Russia is justified in expecting that the complete isolation of Bulgaria in the Balkans and in Europe would make it necessary for Bulgaria to give up its present course of politics and to accept the conditions which Russia would enforce, before it granted Bulgaria its protection and its patronage.

Macedonia plays a prominent part in the home and foreign politics of Bulgaria. If its government finds out that peaceful relations and an alliance with Servia are the only way towards saving at least a portion of Macedonia for Bulgaria, disappointments notwithstanding, no Bulgarian statesman would dare to refuse the offer. It is only by a proceeding which would strengthen Bulgaria, would make it indifferent to Russian temptings and threats, and would preserve the country from isolation, that it could be prevented from ultimately accepting Russia's plan of a Balkan league.

As to Roumania the action of Russia and France became intense before the crisis in the Balkans and with the help of extraordinary distortions and by cleverly encouraging the old

idea of a Greater Roumania, which in this country always smoulders under the fire, had inspired public opinion with hostile feelings against the monarchy and had persuaded Roumania to a military cooperation with Servia, which was scarcely fair, when its duties as an ally of Austria-Hungary are taken into consideration.

This action has not in any way been interrupted; on the contrary it was continued most emphatically with impressive and demonstrative means, such as the Czar's visit to the court of Roumania.

At the same time a complete change took place in Roumanian public opinion and there can be no doubt by this time, that wide circles in the army, among the intelligent classes and among the people are in favour of a new course, and in favour of approaching Russia, of a policy which would have the aim of liberating "our brothers on the other side of the Carpathians". There can be no doubt that the ground has been well prepared for the eventuality of Roumania joining a Balkan league, if it were founded.

Official Roumania has so far resisted the current of popular feeling and the temptations offered by Russia and France, so that it cannot be said that Roumania sides with them or follows a course of politics hostile to Austria-Hungary. But it cannot be denied that a change has come over Roumania's foreign policy, which offers the perspective of future development in the same direction and already has an undeniable effect upon the political and military situation of Austria-Hungary not only, but of the entire Triple Alliance.

Whilst formerly there was no positive reason for doubting Roumanias good will to comply with the duties imposed by the agreement with powers of the Triple Alliance—though it was kept secret — recently competent Roumanian factors have repeatedly and publicly declared that Roumanian policy must be led by the principle of keeping a "free hand". The agreement with Roumania being secret, the Triple Alliance had to refrain from recriminations on this subject. King Carol, with the sincerity that beseems his noble character, declared to the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Bucharest, that as long as he lived, he would always strive to prevent the Roumanian army from taking the

field against Austria-Hungary, but that he could not follow a course of politics contrary to public opinion in Roumania, that therefore in the eventuality of Russia going to war against Austria-Hungary, action on Roumanias part was not to be thought of, notwithstanding the existing alliance. The Roumanian Minister of foreign affairs went one step further—immediately after the Czar's visit to Costanza—and in an interview, admitted without reserve, that an approximation to Russia had taken place and that a community of interests existed between the two countries.

The relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania are at present such that the Monarchy fully adheres to the alliance and would, if a *casus foederis* happened, support Roumania with all its power, whilst Roumania throws off the alliance and promises no more than a neutral attitude. But even Roumania's neutrality is guaranteed by nothing more than a personal promise of King Carol, which only holds good for the duration of his reign, and which he can only keep, if the management of foreign affairs remains in his hands. The whole country being in a state of national excitement, the Kings power might not suffice, and indeed the King himself refers to the general feeling, when he explains why it will be impossible to come up to the full standard of an ally's duties. Also it must be remembered that already Roumania is attached by ties of friendship and common interests to the Monarchys bitterest enemy in the Balkans.

The Monarchy has hitherto limited itself to friendly speech on the change in Roumania's politics in Bucharest and has not seen fit to draw serious consequences from Roumania's deviation from its course of politics. The Vienna cabinet was induced to adopt this course, because the German government held the belief that Roumania was subject to transitory vacillations, consequences of misunderstandings at the time of the crisis, which would disappear of themselves, if we remained calm and patient. But we have seen that these tactics of patience and friendly observations did not have the desired effect, that the process of estrangement between Austria-Hungary and Roumania far from stopping, has thereby been accelerated. A proof that these tactics can give no hopes for

the future, lies in the fact that the present situation of a "free hand" is very much to the advantage of Roumania and quite as much to the detriment of Austria-Hungary.

The question now arises whether Austria-Hungary could mend its relations towards Roumania by speaking out and putting the kingdom before the choice of either breaking off relations altogether, or giving sufficient guarantees to prove that it is willing to fulfil in their entirety the duties arising out of the alliance with the Triple Alliance—which could be done by the publication of the secret agreement. This way of solving the question, which would revive the thirty year old tradition, would certainly be after the heart of Austria-Hungary. But in the present circumstances, it is very improbable that King Carol or any Roumanian government would consent to offend public feeling in Roumania by advertising the country as an ally of the Triple Alliance, even if the conditions of the present agreement were improved. A categorical *aut-aut* on the monarchys part might bring about an open rupture. We cannot judge in Vienna whether serious and impressive representations on the part of the German cabinet, combined with the offers above mentioned, might induce Roumania to adopt an attitude, which would guarantee its full and lasting loyalty as an ally—but we very much doubt that this would be the case.

Under these circumstances it is practically impossible that the alliance with Roumania should ever again become so reliable and so trustworthy, that it might be regarded as the pivot for Austria-Hungary's Balkan politics.


The political and military importance of Roumania make it imperative for Austria-Hungary not to continue remaining passive and possibly imperil its own defences, but to commence military preparations and political actions that will dispel or at least attenuate the effects of Roumanias neutrality and eventual hostility.

The military value of the alliance with Roumania consisted in the case of a conflict with Russia, in having from a military point of view an absolutely free hand towards Roumania, whilst a considerable portion of Russian troops would be engaged by an attack of the Roumanian army. The present

relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania would in the case of an armed conflict with Russia have pretty much the contrary effect. Russia would not have to fear an attack on Roumania's part and would not have to protect its frontier on the Roumanian side, whilst Austria-Hungary would not feel sure of Roumania's neutrality and would have to place its troops in large numbers, where an attack on Roumania's part might be feared.

All Austria-Hungary's past military preparations for the eventuality of a conflict with Russia were based upon the supposition of Roumania's cooperation. If this supposition proves fictitious, if there is not even the certainty that Roumania will not become aggressive, the monarchy must change its dispositions for the eventuality of a war, and must take into consideration that fortifications against Roumania will become necessary.

From a political point of view Roumania must be shown that we are fully able to chose a different point of support for our Balkan policy. While this is being achieved the necessity arises to take effective measures for paralysing the efforts made by the Entente powers for the establishment of a new Balkan league. Both actions cannot be otherwise realised, than by accepting the offer of Bulgaria, made a year ago and repeated several times since, the offer of concluding a definite treaty with that state. At the same time the monarchy must direct its policy towards bringing about an alliance between Turkey and Bulgaria, in favour of which both states are so well disposed, that a short time ago a draught for such a treaty has been worked out, though it has not been signed. This is another instance in which the monarchy, if it continued delaying action out of consideration for Roumania, a feeling which is by no means reciprocated, might seriously prejudice its own interest. Further delay and especially indolence on the part of Bulgaria would give France and Russia free scope to promote their plans. Roumanias attitude literally propels Austria-Hungary in the direction of granting Bulgaria what it has long asked for, and what will frustrate Russias policy of isolating Bulgaria. But these things must be done, while the road to Sofia and Constantinople are still open.



The treaty with Bulgaria, the details of which will have to be well considered, must avoid all particulars, which might in any way violate the obligations contracted in the agreement with Roumania. It is overmore not advisable to make a secret of the alliance with Bulgaria, since there is no hostility against Roumania in this step, but a serious warning by which the responsible factors in Bucharest may learn to understand the consequences of a lasting, onesided political dependence upon Russia.

Before Austria-Hungary undertakes the action in question, it is most anxious to establish a full understanding with the German Empire, not only in consideration of old traditions or of what is due to a close ally, but more especially because vital interests of the Triple Alliance and of Germany are at stake and the safety of common interests can only be ensured if the joint action of Russia and France is opposed by a joint action of the Triple Alliance, especially of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

It must be considered that if Russia, sustained by France tries to unite the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary, if it undermines the relations with Roumania, which are already not the best, these hostile actions are not directed against Austria-Hungary alone, but quite as much against the German Empire, whose geographical situation and internal structure make it the more exposed and accessible part of the Central-European block, which stands in the way of the realisation of Russias world-politic plans.

It is the aim of the two allied powers to check the superiority of the two Empires by making sure of helpful troops on the Balkan, but this is by no means the ultimate aim of Russia.

Whilst France hopes to weaken the monarchy, because this would promote its aspirations of *revanche*, the intentions of Russia are much more comprehensive.

If we analyse the development of Russia during the two last centuries, the extension of its territory, the growth of its number of inhabitants, so much more rapid than that of all other Great Powers in Europe, the progress of its economical resources and of its military command of power, and if we

consider that this enormous Empire is still as good as debarred of the sea, partly by its situation and partly by treaties. it is not difficult to understand why Russia's policy has at all times borne an immanently aggressive character.

It is not in reason to assume that Russia harbours territorial plans of conquest at the expense of Germany, still the extraordinary armaments and the extensive preparations of war, the building of strategical railways towards the West certainly point more to Germany than to Austria-Hungary.

Russia has found out that the realisation of its plans in Europe and Asia, arising from internal necessities, would violate Germany's vital interests and would perforce meet resistance.

The policy of Russia is determined by unchangeable circumstances and is therefore constant and far-seeing.

The manifest tendencies of Russia to isolate and detach Austria-Hungary, which is not following a course of world-policy, have the ultimate aim of making it impossible for the German Empire to continue its resistance against final success and against its political and economical supremacy.

* * *

The above memoir had only just been completed, when the terrible events of Sarajevo happened.

The entire signification of the villanous murder cannot be conceived at this time. Most certainly, if a proof was necessary that the gulf between the monarchy and Servia is beyond bridging over, or that the ambition of Greater Servia in its intensity and recklessness does not stop before anything, that proof has been given.

Austria-Hungary has shown good-will and friendliness to bring about tolerable relations with Servia.

We have a fresh opportunity of judging that all these efforts were in vain and that the monarchy must in future look to the tenacious, irreconcilable and aggressive enmity of Servia.

It is all the more necessary for the monarchy to seize the threads which its enemies are weaving into a net over its head, with a strong hand and tear them once for all.

2.

Relation of the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

(July 1, 1914.)

Gracious Majesty,

Much as I am anxious to avoid disturbing Your Majesty in these days, still it is my duty to make the following brief statement in customary devotion.

The first opportunity which offered for speaking to Count Berchtold was after my audience of Your Majesty, and I did not till then learn his intention to make the horrible deed of Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Servia.

I have not concealed from Count Berchtold that I should consider this a fatal mistake and would certainly not share the responsibility. In the first place we have not sufficient proofs to be able to put the responsibility of the crime upon Servia and to evoke a war, if the Servian government gave satisfactory explanations. We should have the worst *locus standi* imaginable and would be considered by all the world as the disturbers of peace, besides beginning a great war under the most unfavourable circumstances.

In the second place I consider the present moment, when we have as good as lost Roumania, without having been able to replace it, whilst the only state on which we can rely, to wit Bulgaria, is completely exhausted, as most unpropitious.

The present situation of the Balkans would make it easy to find a *casus belli* if one were wanted. When the right time will have come for declaring war, anyone of the different questions could be used for a pretext. But first we must create a diplomatic constellation, which will change the proportions of military power in our favour.

The definite annexation of Bulgaria, in such a way as not to offend Roumania, and to leave the possibility of an understanding with this state and with Greece, is becoming a more urgent necessity every day. A last attempt must be made to induce Germany to find a way of making Roumania join the Triple Alliance openly. If Germany cannot or will not undertake this mission, it must be satisfied if we make sure of Bulgaria for the Triple Alliance.

If we delay much longer to please Roumania, it will be our fault if Bulgaria—left in the lurch by us—one fine day joins the league founded against us and helps to rob us because it will have been promised a piece of Macedonian territory. As to Roumania I believe that the only chance of getting it back will be our alliance with Bulgaria. With all its mania of aggrandisement, the motive power in the soul of the Roumanian people is fear of Bulgaria. If they see that nothing will keep us from an alliance with Bulgaria, they will perhaps offer to join us, so as to be safe from Bulgarian aggression. These are the principal points of view, which according to my belief, make an energetic action on our part necessary and as the forthcoming visit of Emperor William may offer an opportunity, I considered it my duty to approach Your Majesty with the submissive request to graciously make use of Emperor Williams presence in Vienna, for combating that monarchs preference for Servia, a thing that should not be difficult in view of the recent, revolting events and to induce him to support us energetically in our intended Balkan policy.

Budapest, July 1, 1914.

(signed) Stefan Count *Tisza*.

3.

Discourse between Count Berchtold and the German ambassador.

Journal No. 3095.

Vienna, July 3, 1914.

In the course of a discourse with the German ambassador on the 2nd July I called his attention to the fact that the drama of Sarajevo was but another proof of the serious consequences of Greater Servia's systematic intriguing, and added that these dangerous dealings could not be otherwise stopped, than by a regardless action against Servia itself. Not only our interests demand this, but those of Germany as well. To-days message from, Semlin according to which twelve assassins are on the way with the intention of murdering Emperor William, would perhaps open eyes in Berlin to the dangers that threaten us from Belgrade.

Herr von Tschirschky did not deny this, and assured me that according to his belief only firm and energetic acting could have the desired result. I must surely know that during the crisis Germany had repeatedly declared that in Balkan politics it would always stand on our side, whenever that was necessary.

When I remarked that I had repeatedly been assured of this, but that in practise I had not always been supported by the Berlin cabinet and did not know to what extent I could rely upon it, the ambassador replied that privately he understood the attitude of his government to be due to the fact that we were always expounding ideas, but had never formed a definite plan of action and that Berlin could only make our cause its own, if we came forward with such a plan.

Recently Prince Hohenlohe had explained to him the necessity of closing accounts with Serbia. He had answered the Prince that this was "all very fine, but that it must be clear how far one intended to go, what was to be done with Serbia if it came to serious results and above all things a favourable diplomatic situation must be created, and one must first of all be sure of the attitude which Italy and Roumania would adopt. It would be a serious affair to begin war with Serbia, without being safe beforehand that Italy and Roumania would not attack one at the same time."

I replied to the ambassador that the question how far one ought to go and what was eventually to be done with Serbia must at the critical moment be left for us to decide according to circumstances. What was to be done with Serbia in case of a victory—must be regarded in the light of a *cura posterior*. As to Roumania we cannot stoop to questioning it, at the risk of impossible compensations being demanded. When Roumania, without consulting us, joined Serbia in attacking defenceless Bulgaria, very much against our interests, as it well knew, Germany concurred and gave us to understand that we must keep quiet. This is exactly what we ask of Germany now,—that it should use its influence over Roumania in the same sense, when we, to save the integrity of the monarchy strike a blow against Serbia.

Herr von Tschirschky said he considered this perfectly justified, and was thinking more of Italy, which, considering that we were its allies, should be consulted before we took in hand an action involving war.

To this I replied that if we consulted the cabinet of Rome in this question it would no doubt ask for Valona in compensation and this we could not concede. It would be the Berlin cabinet's affair to explain to Rome that we were fighting for our existence and as no turkish territory was in question, the stipulations of the Triple Alliance do not justify Italy in demanding any compensation whatever.

4.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 212.

Vienna, July 4, 1914.

Telegram in cypher.—Night-service.—Strictly private.

Count Hoyos is leaving to-night with an autograph letter of His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty to Emperor William in Berlin. He will bring your Excellency copies of this letter and of an enclosed memoir, which you will forward to the Imperial Chancellor.

Should it be impossible for your Excellency to be received personally by the Kaiser, I must ask you to take every precaution so that the letter is in the Emperors hands in the course of to-morrow, since, according to the papers, Emperor William starts on his Northern voyage on Monday.

I am also very anxious that your Excellency should be received by the Imperial chancellor to-morrow, and I shall ask your Excellency to visit Herr von Bethmann Hollweg in the country, if he is not in Berlin. I consider it of the utmost importance that the Imperial chancellor should speak to you and then to the Emperor on these subjects, before the Emperor starts on his voyage.

5.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 237.

Berlin, July 4, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Under-state-secretary to-day casually asked me did I know anything of a step undertaken in Belgrade by the Imp. and Roy. government reported by the papers. I gave an answer in the negative.

Herr Zimmermann assured me that he considered energetic action on the part of the monarchy, with whom the entire civilised world sympathised, perfectly justified, still he would advise great discretion and would not like to see that humiliating conditions were proposed to Servia.

6.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 237.

Berlin, July 5, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

When I had informed Emperor William that I had an autograph letter from His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty, which Count Hoyos had just brought and which I was to give to him, I received an invitation to lunch with Their Majesties at noon in the Neue Palais.

I gave the autograph letter and the enclosed memoir into the hands of His Majesty. In my presence the Kaiser read both with the greatest attention.

The first thing he assured me was, that he had expected some serious step on our part towards Servia, but that at the same time he must confess that the detailed statement of His Majesty made him regard a serious European complication possible and that he could give no definite answer before having taken council with the Imperial chancellor.

After lunch, when I again called attention to the seriousness of the situation, the Emperor authorised me to inform our gracious Majesty that we might in this case, as in all

others rely upon Germany's full support. He must, as he said before, first hear what the Imperial Chancellor has to say. but he did not doubt in the least that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would agree with him. Especially as far as our action against Servia was concerned. But it was his (Emperor William's) opinion that this action must not be delayed. Russia's attitude will no doubt be hostile, but to this he has been for years prepared, and should a war between Austria-Hungary and Russia be unavoidable, we might be convinced that Germany our old faithful ally, would stand at our side. Russia at the present time was in no way prepared for war, and would think twice before it appealed to arms. But it will certainly set other powers on to the Triple Alliance and add fuel to the fire in the Balkans.

He understands perfectly well that His Apostolic Majesty in his well-known love of peace, would be reluctant to march into Servia; but if we had really recognised the necessity of warlike action against Servia, he (Emperor William) would regret if we did not make use of the present moment, which is all in our favour.

As to Roumania he would take care that King Carol and his councillors would observe a correct attitude.

He cannot sympathise with the idea of concluding an alliance with Bulgaria; he never trusted King Ferdinand and does not trust him now, nor his former or present councillors. Still he would make no objections to a treaty between the monarchy and Bulgaria, but this treaty must contain nothing to offend Roumania and it must—as the memoir proposes, be communicated to Roumania.

Emperor William intends leaving to-morrow morning for Kiel, whence he starts for his northern tour; but before leaving, His Majesty will discourse with the Imperial chancellor on the subject in question. For this purpose he has sent for him to Hohenfinow, and will see him in the Neue Palais this evening.

I shall certainly have an opportunity of discoursing with the Imperial chancellor in the course of to-morrow.

7.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 239.

Berlin, July 6, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

In addition to my telegram No. 237 of yesterday*).

Have just had a long discourse with the Imperial chancellor and the Under-state-secretary, Count Hoyos being present. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg began by saying that Emperor William had instructed him to express his thanks for the autograph letter, which he would answer personally in a few days.

He (the Imperial Chancellor) was also authorised by his Imperial master to give a precise account of the position of the German government towards the imperial letter and the memoir, which he did in these words:

German government perceives all the dangers arising for Austria-Hungary and for the Triple Alliance as well, from Russia's plan of a Balkan league; it perceives also that in this situation we should be desirous to induce Bulgaria to join the Triple Alliance formally, but it must insist that this should be done in a way—as indeed is intended—not to violate our obligations towards Roumania. German Minister in Sofia was authorised to negotiate in this sense with the Bulgarian government, when his Austro-Hungarian colleague will call upon him to do so. At the same time he (the Imperial chancellor) intends instructing the German Minister in Bucharest to speak openly with the king of Roumania, to inform him of the negotiations carried on in Sofia and to call his attention to the fact that he ought to stop the Roumanian agitation against us. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will also cause the king to be told, that he (chancellor) has in the past always advised us to remain friends with Servia, but that after the late events he perceives that this is as good as impossible; Roumania should also take this into account.

With regard to our relations towards Servia the German government is of opinion that we must judge what is to be

*) Vide No. 6.

done to clear the course: whatever way we decide, we may always be certain that we will find Germany at our side, a faithful ally and friend of our monarchy.

In the further course of conversation I ascertained that the Imperial chancellor like his Imperial master considers immediate action on our part as the best solution of our difficulties in the Balkans. From an international point of view he considers the present moment as more favorable than some later time; he agrees with us that we need inform neither Italy nor Roumania beforehand of an intended action against Servia. On the other hand Italy should even now be informed of the intention to allow Bulgaria to join the Triple Alliance.

Both the Imperial chancellor and the undersecretary of state were of opinion that it would be best to negotiate a treaty with Bulgaria only at present and to leave it to the future whether Turkey and eventually Greece would bind themselves to Bulgaria. Chancellor remarked that in view of the great interests which Germany has in Turkey, this countrys accession would be most desirable.

With regard to the step to be undertaken in Bucharest by the representative of Germany, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thinks it might be useful, when King Carol's answer has reached Berlin, that Count Czernin should shortly afterwards speak with the king on the same subject.

At the conclusion of our discourse, the chancellor asked how matters were going on in Albania and warned earnestly against plans, which might endanger our relations towards Italy or the duration of the Triple Alliance.

Herr von Tschirschky will be informed of our discourse in strict privacy.

8.

Council of ministers for common concerns.

(July 7, 1914.)

K. Z. 58.

G. M. K. P. Z. 512.

Protocol

of the council of ministers for common concerns held in Vienna Juli 7, 1914 with the Minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold in the chair.

Present:

The Imp. Roy. President of the council of ministers
Count Stürgkh.

the Roy. Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

the Imp. and Roy. Common Finance-minister Dr. Ritter
von Biliński.

the Imp. and Roy. War-minister F. Z. M. Ritter von Kro-
batin.

the Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff G. d. I.
Baron von Conrad.

the Representative of the Naval Commander. Vice-Admiral
von Kailer.

Keeper of the Protocol: Secretary of legation Count
Hoyos.

Subject of Council: Bosnian concerns. The diplomatic
action against Servia.

The President opens the sitting remarking that the council of ministers had been called together to advise on the measures to be taken for meeting the evils which in Bosnia and Herzegovina have resulted from the catastrophe of Sarajevo. According to his view there would be a number of internal measures which the critical state of Bosnia has made desirable; but before deciding in their favour there should be clearness whether the moment has not come when an enunciation of power might put an end to Servia's intrigues once and for all. A decisive stroke of this kind cannot be dealt without previous diplomatic preparation, and for this reason the German government was informed and consulted. The discussions with Germany brought about a most satisfactory result, since Emperor William as well as Herr von Bethmann Hollweg solemnly promised the support and aid of Germany in the eventuality of a warlike complication with Servia. We must still take into account Italy and Roumania, he agreed with the Berlin cabinet that it would be better to act first and wait for eventual claims to compensation afterwards.

He is by no means convinced that an expedition to Servia must necessarily involve us in a war with Russia. Russia's present policy, which is farsighted, is aiming at a league of the Balkan states including Roumania, which it would

at a suitable moment play out against our monarchy. It is his belief that we must take into account that in the face of this policy our situation must become more precarious as time goes on, all the more because if we do not act, our own South-slavs and Roumanians will interpret our attitude as weakness, and would be all the more disposed to lend a willing ear to the persuasions of our neighbours across the frontier.

The logical result of what has been said, would be to get in advance of our foes and by coming to terms with Servia, to stop the development of the process at present going on, a result which we may not be able to attain later on.

The Royal Hungarian Premier agrees with us that during the last days the situation has changed on account of the facts which judicial examination has brought forth and also on account of the attitude of the Servian press, and fully admits that the possibility of a warlike action against Servia seems nearer than he believed just after the crime of Sarajevo. But he would never consent to a surprise attack upon Servia without a previous diplomatic action, such as he is afraid is being intended and he is sorry to hear, has been discoursed about by Count Hoyos in Berlin. We should, he believes in this case play a sorry figure in the eyes of all Europe, and should draw upon ourselves the enmity of all the Balkan states with the exception of Bulgaria, which is too weak just now to be of any effective help.

It is absolutely necessary that we address demands to Servia and if these are rejected we must make out an ultimatum. Our exactions may be hard, but not such that they cannot be complied with. If Servia accepted them, we should have a splendid diplomatic success and our *prestige* in the Balkans would gain immensely. If our demands are refused, he would also vote for a warlike action, but he must call attention to the fact that by a war we could reduce the *size* of Servia, but we could not completely annihilate it. Russia would fight to the death before allowing this and he, as Hungarian Premier could never consent to the Monarchy's annexing any part of Servia.

It is not for Germany to decide whether we ought to go to war with Servia just now or not. Personally he holds the belief that it is not absolutely necessary to begin a war at the present moment. We must remember that agitation against us in Roumania is exceedingly busy just now and that in view of the excited feelings of the population we should almost certainly have to look forward to a Roumanian attack and we should doubtless have to protect Transylvania by a strong force to intimidate the Roumanians. Now that Germany has happily opened the way to Bulgaria's joining the Triple Alliance, a promising perspective for successful diplomatic action in the Balkan opens out, since by the accession of Bulgaria and Turkey to the Triple Alliance we may outbalance Roumania and Servia and perhaps induce Roumania to return to the Triple Alliance. With regard to European countries it must be considered that the forces of France when compared to those of Germany are diminishing on account of the continual reduction of the figures of its births, so that Germany will be in a position to muster more troops against Russia.

All these circumstances must be considered, when a resolution involving such exceedingly heavy responsibility was to be taken, and he must again declare, that notwithstanding the crisis in Bosnia, where a great deal might be done by a reform of the administration, he could not make up his mind in favour of the war, but still thought that a marked diplomatic success, which would cause a deep humiliation of Servia, would decidedly improve our situation and give us a chance of initiating an advantageous policy in the Balkans.

The presiding Minister (Berchtold) took up this argument and remarked that diplomatic successes against Servia had increased the Monarchy's *prestige* for the time being, but had in the end also increased the tension in the relations with Servia. Neither our success in the crisis of the annexion, nor that of creating the Albanian state, nor yet Servia having had to give way after the ultimatum of the autumn of last year changed any of our circumstances. A radical solution of the question raised by the propaganda for a Greater Servia, which is systematically set to work in Belgrade and whose

corrupting effects we feel from Agram to Zara, can only be brought about by the exertion of main force.

With regard to the danger of hostilities on the part of Roumania, mentioned by the Hungarian premier, the presiding minister was of opinion that it is less to be feared at the present time than in the future, when the partnership of interests between Roumania and Servia will have developed. King Carol it is true, has expressed doubts whether under present circumstances he would be able to do his whole duty as an ally by giving active help when it was wanted. But we cannot assume that he would consent to a warlike operation against the monarchy, or that he would be unable to oppose public feeling in such an eventuality. Besides it must be remembered that Roumania stands in fear of Bulgaria and would not be free to act at pleasure, even under present circumstances.

As to the Hungarian Premier's remark with regard to the proportion of forces between France and Germany, he thought it right to call attention to the fact that the diminution of the population in France was more than balanced by the increasing number of inhabitants in Russia, so that the assertion that Germany would in time have more troops at its disposition against France cannot be taken into account. The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) remarked that the present council of ministers had been called for the purpose of discussing the measures to be taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure the success of the judicial examinations on the assassination and to counteract against the movement in favour of Greater Servia observed in Bosnia. These questions must go to the rear if the greater question arises, whether we might not solve the Bosnian difficulty by exercising force against Servia.

Two reasons make this question very pressing just now: in the first place the chief commander in Bosnia and Herzegovina declares that it is his belief that no successful measures could be applied in the interior of these provinces unless we deal Servia a forcible stroke first. His opinion is founded on his own perceptions and on his thorough knowledge of the country. These perceptions on general Potiorek's part make it imperative to ask, whether we are at all able to stop the decomposing activity which originates in Servia, and whether

we are able to keep the two provinces in question if we do not promptly deal a blow to Servia.

During the last few days the whole situation has changed. It now shows a psychological character and is decidedly more than ever pointing to a solution at the point of the sword. He cannot help agreeing with the Hungarian premier that it is for us and not for the German government to decide whether a war is necessary or not; still he must say that our decision should be influenced strongly by the fact that where we look to for the faithfulest support of our policy in the Triple Alliance, we are promised unreserved loyalty and are advised to act without delay. Count Tisza should consider this circumstance and remember that by a weak and hesitating policy we might risk not being so certain of German support at some future time. This is surely of the highest importance, next to the interest we have in restoring order in Bosnia, and should be well considered.

It is but a question of detail how we are to begin and if the Hungarian government thinks that a surprise attack, *sans crier gare* as Count Tisza expresses it, is not feasible, we will have to find some other way; but what he thinks is absolutely necessary is to act without delay and to spare our national economy a protracted period of suspense. But all this is mere detail considered side by side with the question of principle, whether it is absolutely necessary to have a war or not. Here the *prestige* and the existence of the monarchy must decide, whose South-slav provinces speaker holds to be lost if nothing is done to prevent it.

We should therefore decide in principle to-day that action must and shall follow. He shares the presiding ministers belief that a mere diplomatic success would not improve the situation. If a foregoing diplomatic action is therefore resorted to for international reasons, it should be taken with the firm resolve that this action can only end with the war.

The Common Finance-minister (Biliński) remarks that Count Stürgkh based his opinion upon the fact that the chief commander of Bosnia desires the war. It is two years since General Poliorek holds the belief that we must measure our forces with those of Servia if we wish to keep Bosnia and

Herzegovina. We must keep in mind that the chief commander, who is on the spot, is by far the best judge of things. Herr von Biliński is also convinced that a decisive conflict is unavoidable sooner or later. He never doubted that when matters became serious, Germany would stand on our side and had received binding assurances to this effect from Herr von Tschirschky as long ago as 1912. The recent events in Bosnia had produced a very dangerous state of feeling in Serbia. Especially the Servian pogrom in Serajevo excited and embittered all Servians to such a degree that it is impossible to decide, who among our Servians is still loyal and who is for Greater Serbia. It will be impossible ever to change this situation by measures taken within our frontiers; the only means will be to bring about an ultimate decision, whether the idea of Greater Serbia may be successful in the future or not.

Even if the Royal Hungarian Premier would be satisfied with a diplomatic success, he could not say as much for himself from the point of view of Bosnian interests. The ultimatum, which we sent Serbia last autumn made matters worse in Bosnia, and inflamed the hatred against us. The people of Bosnia tell each other everywhere that King Peter is coming to liberate the country. Servians are not amenable to anything but force and a diplomatic success would have no effect whatever in Bosnia, but it might most likely do harm.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) remarked that he had the highest esteem for the military merits of the present chief commander of Bosnia; as to the civil administration no one would deny that it had missed fire absolutely, and that a reform was indispensable. He would refrain from speaking on this subject just now, all the more because this was not the time for making changes, still he would like the fact established that the Bosnian police must be in an indescribable state, if it was possible for six or seven individuals known to the police, to take up their position on the day of the assassination along the intended route of the heir to the throne, armed with bombs and revolvers, whilst the police did not observe or remove even a single one of them. He did not understand why a thorough reform of the administration of Bosnia should not improve the situation there.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) is of opinion that a diplomatic success would be of no use at all. A success of this kind would be interpreted as weakness. From a military point of view he must remark that it would be better to go to war immediately, rather than at some later period, because the proportion of forces must in course of time change to our disadvantage. As to the modality of the beginning of war, he must call attention to the fact that the two big wars of latter years, the war between Russia and Japan, as also the Balkan war began without a foregoing declaration of war. It was his belief that we should at first only carry through the mobilisation as it is prepared against Serbia, and postpone the general mobilisation to such a time when it becomes clear that Russia is acting.

We have already lost two opportunities for solving the Servian question and have postponed the decision each time. If we do this again and allow this provocation to pass unavenged, this will be taken for a proof of weakness in all South-slav provinces and would be an encouragement to agitation against us.

From a military point of view it is desirable that the mobilisation should be carried through immediately and as secretly as possible, and that an ultimatum should be addressed to Serbia when the mobilisation is complete. This would also be in our favour with regard to the Russian forces, because just now the divisions are incomplete on account of the leave given for harvestwork.

After this a discussion began on the aims of a war against Serbia, during which the Royal Hungarian Premier's view, that Serbia might be reduced as to size but not annihilated out of consideration for Russia, was adopted by all. The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) said that he should advise that the Kara-georgevich dynasty be removed, and the crown given to a European prince. The reduced kingdom should also be placed in a dependent position towards the monarchy, at least from a military point of view.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) still holds the belief that a successful Balkan policy could be created by the addition of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, and calls attention to

the terrible calamity of a European war under present circumstances. It should not be overlooked that all kinds of eventualities are possible in the near future—Russia might be absorbed by Asian complications, Bulgaria, when it regains its strength might want to revenge itself upon Serbia, etc. which would all improve our position towards the problem of Greater Serbia, to what it is at present. The presiding Minister (Berchtold) replied to these arguments that certainly one might imagine many possibilities in the future, which would place us in a favourable situation. But he feared that there was no time to wait for such developments. The fact must be taken into account that our enemies are preparing for a decisive conflict with the monarchy and that Roumania is lending a helping hand to the diplomacy of Russia and France. One must not assume that our policy with Bulgaria will be a full equivalent for the loss of Roumania. It is his belief that Roumania cannot be won back as long as Servian agitation continues, because agitation for Greater Roumania follows the Servian and will not meet with opposition until Roumania feels isolated by the annihilation of Serbia and sees that its only chance of being supported, is to join the Triple Alliance. We must moreover not forget the fact that with regard to Bulgarias accession to the Triple Alliance the very first step has not been made. All we know is that the present Bulgarian government a few months ago expressed this wish and was then about to conclude an alliance with Turkey. This has not been accomplished, on the contrary Turkey has since allowed Russia and France to gain influence with it. The attitude of the Radoslawoff cabinet is certainly such, that we cannot doubt that Bulgaria is still disposed to lend a willing ear to any positive propositions we might make in the sense referred to. Still we cannot make these assumptions a safe cornerstone of our Balkan politics all the less, because the present Bulgarian government has no sound basis; public opinion, which is always influenced by Russia to a certain degree, might object to joining the Triple Alliance and Radoslawoff's cabinet might be turned out. We must also remember that Germany accepted the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance at the condition only that Roumania should not take offence. This

condition is rather difficult to comply with and might at some future time be the cause of misunderstandings.

A lengthy debate on the question of the war followed. The result of the discussion may be reassumed as follows:

1. That all present wish for a speedy decision of the controversy with Serbia, whether it be decided in a warlike or a peaceful manner;

2. that the council of ministers is prepared to adopt the view of the Royal Hungarian Premier according to which the mobilisation is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Serbia and after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent.

All present except the Royal Hungarian Premier hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless and that therefore such stringent demands must be addressed to Serbia, that will make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened.

Count Tisza remarked that he was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Serbia should be hard indeed, but not such as to make our intention of raising unacceptable terms clear to everybody. Otherwise we should not have a lawful basis for our declaration of war. The text of the note must be composed with utmost care and he should very much beg to be allowed to see it before it is sent. He must also clearly state that if his point of view was disregarded, he would draw the unavoidable consequences.

After this the sitting was interrupted to be reopened in the afternoon.

When the council of ministers met again, the Chief of the General Staff and the Representative of the Naval Commander were also present.

The War-minister (Krobatin) at the request of the presiding minister spoke first to ask the Chief of the General Staff three questions as follows:

1. Whether it is possible to mobilise against Serbia only at first and against Russia not until necessity arises.

2. Whether it is possible to retain a large body of troops in Transylvania to intimidate Roumania.

3. Where the conflict with Russia could be taken up.

The Chief of the General Staff answered these questions privately and begged that the answers should not appear in the protocol.

A lengthy debate followed these explanations, touching upon the proportion of forces and the probable course of a European war, which being of a private character are not adapted to be taken into the protocol.

Before the debate was closed the Hungarian Premier (Tisza) again explained his point of view on the question of the war and appealed again to all present to consider carefully what they were about to decide.

The points which were to be contained in the note to Servia were then discussed.

With regard to these points the council of ministers did not take a resolution; but they were formed, so as to give a clear idea of what might be asked of Servia.

At this point the Chief of the General Staff and the Representative of the Naval Commander left the council, which discussed the internal situation of Bosnia and the necessary measures to be taken. The Common Finance-minister was the first to speak, saying that in conferences with the party-leaders held a few days ago, he had learnt that it would not be wise to dissolve the diet just now, as political losses would thereby be incurred. It was not possible to hold any sittings just now while everybody was so exceedingly excited; he would therefore close the diet and recall the deputies for a short session in September. He hoped that it would then be possible to get the budget and the *Kmeten*-bill voted. This would depend in the first place upon Dimovich not renouncing the leadership of the government party, as in this case the majority would still be for the government. When the diet is closed, the deputies are not paid and immunity ceases, so that the Chief Commander's and the War-minister's wish could be fulfilled without resorting to the dissolution of the diet. Herr von Biliński then

mentioned a number of other measures, which he thought desirable, among them the dissolution of the great Servian society Prosvjeta.

The Royal Hungarian Premier would not like to propose any great changes just now. He again refers to the state of the police in Sarajevo and declares that the decline of the administrative apparatus in Bosnia is the consequence of the overpowering position of the chief commander, who being a soldier cannot possibly have the experience necessary to the administrator of a large country.

The Common Finance-minister speaks for the Chief Commander's merits as an administrator, but freely admits that it would be desirable that civil administration should be entirely separated from the military and that Bosnia should have a governor besides the chief commander, as is the case in Dalmatia.

Special measures to be taken in Bosnia, proposed by the Imp. and Roy. War-minister are then discussed.

All present agree that some of General Krobatin's propositions should be accepted, whilst others went too far. That it was not possible to decide definitely over measures relating to administration, before the great question whether there was to be war with Servia or not, was decided. The presiding Minister (Berchtold) declares that though there were still differences of opinion between the members of the council and Count Tisza, still an agreement had been arrived at, since the propositions of the Hungarian Premier would in all probability lead to a war with Servia, the necessity of which he and all the other members of the council had understood and admitted.

Count Berchtold then told the council that he intended going to Ischl on the 8th of the month to report to His. Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty. The Royal Hungarian Premier begged that the minister would present to His Majesty a relation in which he (Tisza) would record his view of the situation *).

*) Vide No. 12.

After a communication to the press had been agreed upon, the presiding minister closed the sitting.

I have taken insight into the contents of this protocol.

Vienna, August 16, 1914.

Francis Joseph m. p.

Clerk of the council:

A. Hoyos m. p.

Berchtold m. p.

9.

Direct report of Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 7, 1914.

In the common conference of ministers held to-day, the question of an eventual warlike action against Serbia was exhaustively discussed.

It was ascertained that a perfect identity of opinion cannot be established. Count Tisza held the view that a warlike action against Serbia should only be resorted to if it was impossible to humiliate Serbia diplomatically. Count Tisza fears that in the eventuality of war we should have to meet Serbias friends and allies in the Balkans, and that Bulgaria is at present too weak to render effective aid.

When the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, to which the German government has now consented, will have been accomplished, we shall be in a much better situation.

All the other members of the conference shared the view I hold, that the present opportunity for a warlike action against Serbia should be made use of, because by delay our situation would suffer, and because the Bulgarian arrangement, towards which nothing has as yet been done, even if it fully succeeds, will not entirely compensate the certain deterioration of our relations with Serbia and Roumania and the political conditions in our own country connected with it.

I will take the deferential liberty of reporting by word of mouth to Your Majesty on Thursday morning, having been obliged to postpone my journey to Ischl, because Count Tisza

requested me to present to Your Majesty a lengthy memoir on his view of the case, which cannot be completed before to-morrow night*).

In profoundest deference.

10.

Letter from Count Berchtold to Count Tisza.

Vienna, July 8, 1914.

Tschirschky has just left me, who told me that he had received a telegram from Berlin, by which his Imperial master instructs him to declare emphatically that in Berlin an action of the monarchy against Servia is fully expected and that Germany would not understand why we should neglect this opportunity of dealing a blow.

My remark that in taking a decisive resolution we should consider it of the greatest importance to know how far we could rely upon Germanys influence being used in Roumania, and what result we might hope for, was answered by the ambassador to the effect that Berlin thinks it is altogether out of question that Roumania would in this case act against the monarchy. Emperor William has already addressed a letter on the subject to King Carol and we might be very sure that it left nothing to be desired in plainness of speech!

The ambassadors further remarks showed me that Germany would consider further negotiating with Servia a confession of weakness on our part, and this would damage our position in the Triple Alliance and might influence Germanys future policy.

Tschirschkys remarks impressed me so much, that I thought they might in some degree influence your ultimate decisions, and for this reason I am informing you without delay and begging you, if you are of the same mind, to telegraph to me (in cypher) while I am at Ischl, where I stay all to-morrow and shall be glad to be your interpreter with His Majesty.

*) Vide No. 12.

11.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 220.

Vienna, July 8, 1914.

In cypher.—Strictly private.

Herr von Tschirschky, as instructed, repeated to me the declarations which are contained in your Excellency's telegrams No. 237 and 239*).

I shall beg your Excellency to go to the Imperial chancellor and express my warmest thanks for these declarations, dictated by the spirit of purest loyalty. The readiness with which the Imperial government acceded to my propositions, is a fresh proof, that the aims and the marked lines of the policy followed by the two allied powers in the Balkans, are identical.

As soon as ultimate resolutions have been taken (the time depends upon how soon the judicial inquiry in Sarajevo is concluded), I will communicate them without delay to the Imperial government.

With regard to the diplomatic steps of the Triple Alliance in the case of Bulgaria, I should like to say that it would be advisable to delay giving information in Bucharest, because, should we go to war with Servia, the information in question might cause Roumania to adopt a very unfriendly attitude towards us.

12.

Relation of the Hungarian Premier Count Tisza.

(July 8, 1914.)

Gracious Majesty,

The gratifying news from Berlin, combined with the indignation felt over the events in Servia, in yesterday's conference of ministers matured the intention of bringing about a war with Servia and to settle accounts with this arch-enemy of the monarchy, with all the members of the conference except myself.

*) Vide No. 6 and No. 7.

I was not in a position to approve this plan to its full extent. Such an attack upon Serbia, would—if human foresight does not deceive—cause the intervention of Russia and conjure up the world's war. Notwithstanding Berlin's optimism I should consider the neutrality of Roumania very questionable. Public opinion in Roumania would passionately cry out for war with us, and the present government would not be able to resist. King Carol very little. In this war we should therefore have to expect to see the Russian and the Roumanian armies among our foes, and this would make our chances of war very unfavourable.

I could not give my consent to an action, kindling war under such constellations, all the less because Berlin no longer opposes active, consequential policy promising success in the Balkans, so that we now have the means of using decisive influence on the development in the Balkans and bringing about a more favourable constellation for ourselves. This justifies us in hoping that if later on we should be compelled to resort to a decisive war, we should have a better chance of winning it.

When I asked how the proportion of forces among the Great Powers stood, after the armaments of latter years, the Chief of the General Staff answered, after considering a while: "Rather in our disfavour". I drew the conclusion from this answer that there would be no great difference in the present proportions and that the development of conditions in the Balkans would compensate what was in our disfavour.

It is superfluous again to discuss the action which is to bring about an improvement of the conditions in the Balkans. The accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance is the first step, so to say the Archimedian point, at which we must begin to oust Russia from its present position. Next we should have to see to definitely clearing the relations between Bulgaria and Greece. There are some difficulties in the way, but the chances of success are not bad. Jointly with Germany we must exercise some pressure on Roumania. There will no doubt be an outcry when the accession of Bulgaria becomes a fact, but I am certain that the attitude of Roumania will change visibly immediately afterwards. Chances may be in our

favour, but even in the worst case we may suppose that in the course of a few years we shall be sure of the friendly neutrality of Greece. Roumania will be held in check by Bulgaria, which will have regained its force and Servia will be deprived of a good portion of its army, when Bulgaria begins an action in Macedonia.

I will resume what I have thus far stated. A war, which we would provoke, would have to be fought under most unfavourable circumstances, whilst a postponement, if we make good diplomatic use of it, would change the proportions of forces in our favour.

If besides considering the political points of view, I take into account the state of our finances and our economical interests, which a war would burden immensely, and give a thought to the almost unbearable sacrifices and sufferings which a war would impose upon society, I must — after consulting my conscience — refuse to share the responsibility of a military aggression as it is proposed against Servia.

I am far from advising an inactive or unenergetic policy towards Servia. We cannot remain indolent spectators of the intrigues spun against us, we cannot see our own subjects encouraged in high treason, or assassinations plotted. The explanations published by the Servian (even the semi-official) press not only, but by the representatives of Servia in foreign countries, betray so much hatred and such total want of international decency, that out of consideration for our *prestige* and our safety we must act in an energetic way against Servia, if we are not indifferent to what foreign countries and our own think of us.

I am not pleading that we should pocket these provocations and am prepared to take the responsibility for all the consequences, which a rejection of our just demands would entail. But according to my belief Servia must be given the possibility to avoid a war by suffering a heavy diplomatic defeat. If a war is unavoidable, all the world must see that we are acting in defence, not defiance.

A strictly measured, but not a threatening note should therefore be addressed to Servia, in which all our concrete complaints are enumerated and precise demands are formu-

lated. As such I should propose the recalling of the Servian diplomats Spalajkovic in Petersburg and Jovanovic in Berlin: I should demand satisfactory information on the Kragujevac origin of the bombs found in Bosnia and on the fact that compromised subjects of the monarchy have crossed the frontier with forged passports. The Servian authorities must overmore explain the hostile and seditious declarations of Servian officials and officers, which I hope will soon be ascertained. Attention should also be called to the universally known defectiveness of the press, the societies and the schools in Servia, and satisfaction demanded in each case.

If Servia gives an unsatisfactory answer or seems disposed to delay giving an answer, an ultimatum should be sent and when the allowed time is over, hostilities might begin. In this case the war would have been forced upon us - no country that wishes to continue existing as a State—can refuse to fight out such a war; and besides we should have put the blame on Servia, which courted the danger of war by refusing to comply with the duties of a decent neighbour, after such an event as the abomination of Sarajevo.

Such an attitude on Servias part might considerably improve the chances of the German action in Bucharest and might even prevent Russia from participating in the war. It is probable that England would exercise a pressure upon the other powers of the Entente and that the thought would have weight with the Czar, that it cannot be his business to extend a protecting hand over anarchist plots and antidynastic murders.

To avoid complications with Italy and to be sure of the sympathies of England, besides making it possible for Russia to remain an idle spectator of the war, we should find the right time and the right form for declaring that we do not mean to annihilate Servia, and certainly will not annex it. It is my belief that after a successful war it would be best to reduce the size of Servia, by returning its newly acquired territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and to ask only certain important strategic corrections of the frontierlines. We should be justified in asking an indemnity for our war expenses and this would keep Servia in check for a long while.

These are the aims we should keep in view in the eventuality of war. If Serbia yields to pressure, we must accept this solution of the difficulty *bona fide* and not hinder its retreat. In this case we must be satisfied with the blow to Servias pride, with its diplomatic defeat, and take up a wellaimed, intense action with Bulgaria and the other Balkan states, and we may be sure that the diplomatic victory over Serbia would have a favourable influence upon the negotiations that will become necessary.

I have taken the liberty to give my impression of the situation at length. I am aware of the heavy responsibility which all are obliged to bear in these critical times, who have the honour to possess Your Majestys confidence. Knowing well that the burden of responsibility will be equally heavy, whether we decide for acting or for leaving things alone. I have, after painful consideration of all the arguments, which come in question, the honour to advise a middle road, which does not exclude a peaceful arrangement and to a certain degree improves our chances of war—should war be unavoidable.

It will be my duty in to-morrows council of ministers to cause the Hungarian cabinet to declare itself. In the meantime I can only declare in my own name that notwithstanding my devotion to the service of Your Majesty, or rather on account of my devotion, I could not share the responsibility for an exclusively aggressive solution of our difficulties.

Budapest, July 8, 1914.

(signed) Stephen Count *Tisza*.

13.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 244.

Berlin, July 9, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Received your Excellencys telegram No. 220 of yesterday*).

I have sent your Excellencys warmest thanks to the Imperial chancellor, who is on leave in Hohenfinow, by the state secretary, only just returned from leave.

*) Vide No. 11.

I was able to ascertain that the state secretary perfectly agrees with the attitude the German government has adopted and is most decidedly of opinion that the action proposed against Servia should be taken in hand without delay.

The German minister in Bucharest is instructed to hold back the intended communication to King Carol (vide my telegram of the 6th inst.*) about the negotiations with Bulgaria, which as far as he—Jagow—knows, have not yet begun in any concrete form.

14.

The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff to Count Berchtold.

Gen. Staff No. 2508 res.

(No date, about July 10, 1914.)

Your Excellency,

In addition to what I said in the conference which recently took place under the presidency of your Excellency, I should like to send you the following in writing:

In my position as chief of the General Staff it is of utmost importance that the formula be clearly defined, whether we are to exert ourselves to bring about a war with Servia or whether we are merely to take into account the possibility of a war.

In what way either of these possibilities is to be treated diplomatically is outside my sphere of activity, but I must repeat, as I have fully agreed with you, that our diplomatic steps must avoid everything that would delay action by protracted negotiations, so that our antagonists would gain time for military preparations, which would put us at a military disadvantage, always injurious, but very much so, in the case of Servia and Montenegro.

For the same reason everything should be avoided, that might alarm our antagonists and cause them to take counter-measures; on the contrary, peaceful intentions should be feigned.

*) Vide No. 7.

If on the other hand our mind is made up for war, our military interests demand that a single step should be taken, with a short term for the ultimatum, which, if it be answered in the negative, must immediately be followed by the order for mobilisation.

I beg your Excellency to accept the expression of my highest esteem.

(signed) *Conrad*, G. o. I.

15.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 60/P.

Berlin, July 12, 1914.

Subject:

Germany's attitude in the
present Servian crisis.

To His Excellency the minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and Foreign Affairs Count Berchtold.

My telegraphic reports during the last days and Count Hoyos' personal impressions have informed your Excellency that not only His Majesty Emperor William but all the other persons in authority, not only adhere firmly to the allied monarchy, but are encouraging us emphatically not to neglect the present moment, but to treat Servia with full energy, so as to clear out the conspirators' nest once for all, and are leaving the choice of means for doing so to our judgment.

I never for a moment doubted that Emperor William and all the German Empire would loyally fulfil the duties of an ally, and I have been faithful to this conviction during the whole period of my ambassadorship in Berlin. I was not in the least surprised when in the present moment Germany assured us of its perfect loyalty and assistance.

Still I think that the fact, that His Majesty, Emperor William and with him all persons in authority, urge us to undertake an action against Servia, which may eventually end in war, needs some explanation.

It is clear that after the late deplorable events, the monarchy must use all energy in its dealings with Servia, but the

fact that the German government from its own point of view, considers the present moment for politically opportune, must be set in the right light.

According to the German way of thinking, entirely shared by myself, general political considerations, and special ones, inspired by the murder of Sarajevo, form the conclusive argument.

Germany has recently found its conviction confirmed that Russia is preparing for a war with its western neighbours, and does not regard war as a possibility of the future, but positively includes it in the political calculations of the future. This is important: it intends waging war, it is preparing for it with all its might, but does not propose it for the present, or we should rather say, is not prepared for it at the present time.

It is therefore anything but certain that if Servia is embarked in a war with us, Russia would lend an armed hand; and should the Czars empire resolve for war, it would not be ready from a military point of view, and not by any means so strong, as it will be a few years hence.

Overmore the German government believes that it has proofs that England would not take part in a war, caused by disturbances in the Balkans, even if Russia and France were involved in it. Not only have the relations between England and Germany improved so far, that Germany need no longer fear direct hostilities on Englands part, but England just now desires anything rather than a war, and would certainly not expose itself to danger for Servias or even Russias sake.

When all is said, it must be admitted that the constellation is at present as favourable as it can be.

In the past, a large portion of our population refused to believe in the separatist tendencies of our Servians, hostile to the monarchy and expressed doubts that Servias intrigues reached across the frontier; all are now convinced and there is a general outcry for an energetic treatment of Servia, which will finally suppress all agitation for a Greater Servia.

In a similar manner the eyes of the whole world have been opened and there is no nation that does not condemn the bloody deed of Sarajevo and all admit that we must make Servia responsible for it. If Servias foreign friends for political reasons do not openly blame Servia, still we cannot believe that they will stand up for it at the present moment, at least not with armed forces.

These I believe to be the political reasons why the German Empire with a clear perception of the opportunity offered, unreservedly encourages us to make clear our relations towards Servia, which Germany also feels to be untenable, in such a manner, as to stop panslavist agitation for all time.

In Emperor Williams case these political grounds are, as I learn from a quarter, very much in His Majestys confidence, enhanced by a purely personal circumstance, the infinite enthusiasm for our gracious Majesty, who as his letter to Emperor William proves, is prepared to act with admirable energy, where the vital interests and the *prestige* of the countries, entrusted to his care, are at stake.

The Imp. and Roy. Ambassador:
(signed) *Szögyény.*

16.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 801.

Vienna, July 12, 1914.

Telegram in cypher.—Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the embassy.

The action, on which your Excellency has been informed by Count Forgách will probably be taken in hand at the end of this month; the details will be settled this week. The German government, with whom we are acting in perfect harmony, is of opinion, shared by me, that the Italian government should not be informed, but placed in a situation that cannot be averted, by our grave attitude in Belgrade. Still I must ask your Excellencys opinion, whether it would not be

advisable to inform Marquis di San Giuliano a day or at least some hours previously, to avoid giving offence, and also that he may be in a position to impress the public and the press in a sense favourable towards the Triple Alliance.

With regard to the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, Count Tarnowsky will in the course of this week commence cautious negotiations with the Bulgarian cabinet. As soon as we have attained the certainty that a treaty can at present be concluded, we will inform the Italian government and ask it to cooperate.

17.

**Councillor von Wiesner to the Imp. and Roy. Department
of Foreign Affairs.**

Telegram without number.

Sarajevo, July 13, 1914.

Cypher.

It is the firm belief of all persons in authority here, that Serbia is busily spreading propaganda for Greater Serbia—not to speak of the press—through societies and other organisations, and that everything is done with the knowledge and sanction of the Servian government.

Civil and military authorities have given me the material upon which they base their belief; it may be classified as follows:

The material of the time before the assassination contains no proofs that the Servian government promoted propaganda. There is not much, but sufficient material to prove that the movement originates in Serbia and is tolerated by the government.

Judicial inquiry on assassination.

There is nothing to prove or even to suppose that the Servian government is accessory to the inducement for the crime, its preparation or the furnishing of weapons. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe that this is altogether out of question.

From evidence of accused persons, ascertained almost indubitably that the crime was resolved upon in Belgrade and that preparations were made with the coercion of Servian state-officials Ciganovic and Major Tankosic, who jointly provided bombs, Brownings, ammunition and prussic acid. Guilt of Pribicevic not ascertained; reports about him based on regrettable misunderstandings on part of examining police organs.

There can be no doubt that bombs came from army stores in Kragujevac, but there is no proof that they were obtained for the crime, as they might have been in the hands of the Komitadschis since the war.

Evidence of accused persons leaves scarcely a doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic, Grabez, with bombs and weapons upon them, were secretly smuggled across the frontier to Bosnia by Servian organs, under the direction of Ciganovic. These organised transports were directed by the frontier-captains Schabatz and Loznica and were contrived by frontier guards. Though it is not ascertained that they knew the purpose of the journey, still they must have accepted secrecy of mission.

Other information gives insight into organisation of propaganda carried on by "Narodna odbrana". This is valuable material, which will be useful, but has not yet been sifted; will be delivered without loss of time.

If the demands put forth at the time I left, are still valid, the following might be added to what is demanded of Servia:

A. Suppression of government organs' coercion in smuggling persons and goods across frontier.

B. Dismissal of Servian frontier-captains Schabatz and Loznica and the implicated frontier-guards.

C. Prosecution of Ciganovic and Tankosic.

I leave for Vienna this evening, arrive on Tuesday evening and go direct to the Foreign Office.

Verbal explanation necessary.

Emperor William to Emperor and King Francis Joseph*).

Bornholm, July 14, 1914.

My dear friend,

I am grateful that in the days when you were visited by tragic events and were called upon to take resolutions of the gravest importance, your thoughts reverted to our friendship and dictated the letter, with which you gave me a proof of your kind feelings. I consider the friendship with you, which I have taken over from my grandfather and my father as a precious inheritance and the fact that you reciprocate these feelings, is to me the best guarantee of the safety of our countries. Knowing my loving devotion for you, I am sure you will understand how hard it was for me to give up my journey to Vienna and to renounce showing to the world the deep sympathy I felt for your grievous affliction.

Your deserving ambassador, whom I esteem highly, must have given you my assurance that in the hour of serious danger you will find me and my Empire in full harmony with our old tried friendship and with our duties as faithful allies at your side. It is a pleasant duty to repeat this assurance in this place.

The horrible crime of Sarajevo has thrown a gruesome light upon the pernicious doings of insane fanatics and panslavist agitation, threatening the structure of our Empires. I must renounce expressing an opinion on the question, which at this moment remains undecided between your government and Servia. Still I consider it a moral duty for all cultured States and a duty towards their own preservation to oppose this practical propaganda which attacks the sound foundation of all monarchies, to the utmost of their power. I do not close my eyes to the grave danger which threatens your countries and at the same time the Triple Alliance from this Russian and panslavist agitation. I perfectly see the necessity of relieving your southern frontier from the heavy burden which oppresses it. I am therefore willing to support the efforts

*) Vide No. 1.

of your government for preventing the establishment of a new Balkan league under the patronage of Russia, hostile to Austria-Hungary, and overmore to bring about the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance. Although I somewhat doubt the reliability of the Bulgarian character, still I have sent instructions to my representative in Sofia to support the steps your representative has undertaken in this direction.

I have overmore given instructions to my minister in Bucharest to inform King Carol in the way you wish him informed, and referring to the new situation, to persuade him that it will be necessary to renounce too great intimacy with Servia, and to stop the agitation hostile to your countries. I have furthermore instructed him to say, that I am exceedingly anxious to maintain the trustworthy relations of an ally towards Roumania, which need not suffer in any way even if the accession of Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance becomes a fact.

Allow me to conclude with the hearty wish that after the grievous days you have passed through, you may be benefited in your health by your stay in Ischl.

With the assurance of sincere attachment and friendship
your faithful friend
(signed) *Wilhelm*.

19.

Immediate Report of Count Berchtold.

Vienna, July 14, 1914.

In to-days conference, in which took part both premiers and the Hungarian minister at the court of Vienna, a perfect agreement was established with regard to the demands to be addressed to Servia. The text of the note is at present being settled and will be submitted for approval in a conference of the governments on Sunday 19, inst. When the text of the note has been agreed upon, it will be presented in Belgrade on Saturday 25, inst. and the Servian government will at

the same time be informed, that the term for the answer to the note has been fixed at fortyeight hours, within which space of time our demands must be conceded.

The date was selected out of consideration for the visit of the president of the French Republic to the Czar, which is to last from the 20th to the 25th July. All those present were of the same mind as myself, that if we sent the ultimatum during the meeting in Petersburg, this might be regarded as an affront. Overmore, if the ambitious President of the Republic was to discuss personally the new situation created by the ultimatum with the Czar, there is more probability than otherwise, that France and Russia may interfere.

Count Tisza has given up his objections to an ultimatum with so short a term, because I showed him the military difficulties, which would arise from delayed action. I also argued that even after the mobilisation a peaceful arrangement might be possible if Servia gives way in good time.

Of course if this happened, we should have to make Servia pay the costs of the mobilisations, and until payment is made we should have to ask for a pledge in Servia.

Count Tisza most decidedly declared that he would give his consent to the intended action, if before the ultimatum is sent, a council of the ministers of Austria and Hungary votes the resolution that the monarchy is not striving to acquire territory by the war, except what might accrue from small regulations of the frontierlines.

The text of the note, to be sent to Belgrade, as it was settled to-day, is such, that we must reckon with the probability of war. Should Servia decide for conceding our demands, this incident would signify a downright humiliation for the kingdom, not only, but *pari passu* a blow to Russian *prestige* on the Balkan and it would no doubt procure for us certain guarantees that Servian intrigue and underground work on our territory will be restrained.

20.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 512.

Rome, July 14, 1914.

Cypher. — Strictly private.

Answer to your Excellency's telegram of the 12th inst. No. 801 *).

If we are really forcing Servia to decide for war, I also hold the opinion that it would be idle to enter into previous negotiations with Italy; still to avoid the Marquis di San Giuliano taking personal offence, I must most decidedly advise that he should be informed by me one day before the action is undertaken. I do not think that even in this case he would influence the press in our favour, but the excluding and taking him unawares and by surprise would be slightly modified.

Should I be commissioned with this mandate, I beg you to consider that at this moment the minister of Foreign Affairs is at Fiuggi, and towards the end of next week goes to Vallombrosa near Florence, that I must therefore be informed early enough to undertake the journey.

21.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 234.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Telegram in cypher. — Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the embassy.

I have already explained to Herr von Tschirschky the reasons of the delay in our forthcoming explication with Servia, but I am anxious that your Excellency should inform strictly in private the Imperial Chancellor and the Secretary of State of the following:

Although the judicial inquiry in Sarajevo has furnished us with sufficient material, still we believe that we should delay the exceedingly energetic step in Belgrade, until the President of the French Republic, just now on the way to

*.) Vide No. 16.

Petersburg shall have left Russian territory. To begin the action we are proposing at the very moment, when the President as the guest of the Czar is being made much of, might naturally be regarded in the light of an intended affront, and this we should like to avoid. Besides, we should consider it unwise to undertake the threatening step in Belgrade at the very time when the peaceloving, reserved Emperor Nicholas and undeniably cautious Herr Sazonow, are under the influence of the two, who are always for war, Iswolsky and Poincaré.

Under these circumstances we do not think that we ought to realise the plans we have already discussed with Herr von Tschirschky.

This delay, which is in itself unwelcome, will explain the attitude of our officious press.

We are obliged to prevent public opinion in the monarchy, which favours our policy, from cooling in its enthusiasm, and yet we cannot allow the press to get up too much steam, so that other powers might think of mediation.

22.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 820.

Vienna, July 15, 1914.

Strictly private.

To be decyphered by the first official of the Embassy.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 512 of yesterday*).

Count Ambrósy, whose return to Rome I am hastening and who will bring your Excellency some documents referring to our negotiations with Germany connected with the action in question, has been perfectly well-informed on our intentions and the situation, so that he can give you all necessary information.

Count Ambrósy will most likely arrive in Rome on Saturday.

*) Vide No. 20.

Further instructions, especially the text of a note to be presented to the Italian government will reach your Excellency by a courier, probably on Tuesday.

I agree to your Excellency's proposition to inform the Marquis of San Giuliano of our intended action one day before it takes place.

The dates have not been finally fixed and I will warn you in time, so that you may shortly arrange by telegraph for your visit to Marquis San Giuliano; the note will probably be presented on the 25th or the 26th.

23.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 259 bis.

Berlin, July 16, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 234 strictly private of yesterday*).

State Secretary understands perfectly that the intended energetic step in Belgrade cannot be undertaken before the President of the French Republic has left Petersburg, but regrets this delay extremely. Herr von Jagow fears that the sympathetic approval for this step and the interest in it will be debilitated by this delay not only in the Monarchy, but in Germany as well.

Herr von Tschirschky reports that Count Tisza came to see him during his last stay in Vienna and assured him that he had given up the scruples, which he had certainly at first entertained and that he now considered an energetic action necessary; besides Count Tisza had said as much in his declaration in the Hungarian parliament the day before, as Herr von Jagow had learnt to his satisfaction.

*) Vide No. 21.

My Italian colleague since a few days declares the situation to fill him with alarm, but he sees a favourable symptom in the fact that the Imp. and Roy. War-minister and Chief of the General Staff have taken their summer leave.

24.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 523.

Rome, July 18, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

Two members of my embassy in conversation with the German Secretary of the Embassy Count Berchem, received the impression, as if the German ambassador, who is also staying in Fiuggi had already told the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in confidence of our plans with regard to Servia.

This would not be the first instance that in delicate questions between us and Italy, Germany tries to render service to the latter at our expense.

Perhaps this is the reason why the Marquis di San Giuliano, who was to have ended his cure in Fiuggi at the close of next week, to have come to Rome for two days and then gone to Vallombrosa, now writes to me, that he will interrupt his cure on Tuesday 21 inst., and will come to Rome on Tuesday for 24 hours. He will not leave Fiuggi definitely until the 27th inst.

I must therefore be prepared that the minister on Tuesday questions me with regard to our strained relations towards Servia. The Secretary-General de Martino has already attempted to do so. Unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I will show myself absolutely uninformed, although I should be in a painful situation if, from what the minister says, I should see that he has already been taken into the secret (possibly by Germany).

25.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 146.

Petersburg, July 18, 1914.

Cypher.

Herr Sazonow, whom I visited to-day, on his part avoided speaking of our relations towards Servia. I mentioned to him that in our country everybody was still under the sad impression of the recent catastrophe; told him that I considered the beginning of terrorist revolutionary methods in the life of neighbouring people a very serious symptom and a danger for all States, especially for Russia.

The minister did not attempt to deny this, and remarked that he had been somewhat disquieted by the latest news from Vienna. He then expressed his conviction that a proof of the toleration of such doings on the Servian governments part would never be obtained. I answered that I ignored the result obtained up to the present time by the judicial inquiry but that I believed that every government was to a certain degree responsible for what happens on its territory. Overmore the belief is held in Vienna, that, should any demands be adressed to the Servian government on this subject, Servia would meet them halfway.

Though Herr Sazonow had a short time before expressed some anxiety with regard to the form in which these demands might be put, to my German colleague, he did not say anything of the kind to me.

26.

Council of Ministers for Common Affairs.

(July 19, 1914.)

K. Z.

G. M. K. P. Z. 513.

Protocol

of the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs held in Vienna July 19, 1914, the minister of the Imp. and Roy. House and of Foreign Affairs presiding.

Present:

The Imp. Roy. Premier Count Stürgkh.

The Roy. Hung. Premier Count Tisza.

The Imp. and Roy. Common Finance-minister Dr. von Bilinski.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister F. Z. M. von Krobatin.

The Imp. and Roy. Chief of the General Staff G. of I. Baron Conrad von Hötzendorf.

The Representative of the Naval Commander Vice-Admiral von Kailer.

Secretary: Councillor of Legation: Count Hoyos.

Subject under discussion: the forthcoming diplomatic action against Servia.

Before the council of common ministers was constituted and the sitting was opened by the minister in the chair, an informal discussion on the text of the note to be presented to the Servian government, took place and the text was definitely settled.

The Minister in the Chair then opened the council of ministers and proposed that the note should be presented to the Royal Servian government on the 23rd July at five in the afternoon, so that the term of 48 hours would expire on Saturday, 25th inst. at five in the afternoon and the order for mobilisation could be published in the night from Saturday to Sunday. It was Count Berchtolds belief that it is improbable that the news of our step would be publicly known before the President of the French Republic had left Petersburg; but even if this were the case, he did not think that it would do any harm, since we had fully considered the duties of etiquette and had waited until the visit was over. To a prolongation of the delay he must object on diplomatic grounds. Berlin was beginning to get nervous and news of our intentions had already transpired in Rome, so that untoward incidents could not be guarded against, if action were again postponed.

Under the prompting of this declaration, made by the presiding minister, the council voted by common assent that the note should be presented on the 23rd inst. at five in the afternoon.

The Roy. Hungarian Premier (Count Tisza) declares that if the news of the presenting of the ultimatum should reach Budapest from Belgrade on the Thursday, he would speak on

the subject in the Hungarian house of deputies. This was taken into account.

The Chief of the General Staff (Baron Conrad) remarked that for military reasons he was in favour of a speedy beginning of the impending action. The news he had lately received from Serbia showed that three situations had by degrees been created.

First large numbers of troops had been collected along the Bulgarian and Albanian frontiers; next there were reports of great numbers of soldiers having been transported to Old-Servia. Of these he had taken no account, because it was shown that they were merely exchanged for reserves. During the last three days however, he had received more serious news. First he was informed that two regiments, the 6th and the 17th, had been transferred from New-Servia to Old-Servia, and yesterday he heard from a very trustworthy confidential person in Bulgaria, that three divisions had been ordered north. Of course he would have to get these news verified. If they proved true, he must ask to be allowed to take speedy counter-measures.

Next the question of proclaiming the state of siege in all the territory of the monarchy inhabited by South-Slavs was discussed and after a long debate, it was unanimously resolved that the state of siege would not be proclaimed before the mobilisation was published, not only to avoid a bad impression in foreign countries, but also among our own population. The same was resolved for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the state of siege was also to be put in force at the same time as the mobilisation.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) then communicated the diverse measures for the mobilisation, which he had caused to be prepared. His explanations showed that everything necessary could be completed for the Imperial sanction on Wednesday, 22th inst. and that arrangements had been made with both governments with regard to the measures to be taken by the administrative authorities in both countries.

The Council of Ministers then resolved to send a private letter to the chief commander of Bosnia and Herzegovina

through the common finance-minister, informing him of the intentions of the Imp. and Roy. government with regard to Servia.

At the express desire of the Roy. Hungarian Premier (Tisza) the Chief of the General Staff gives private information on the mobilisation, and answers in the affirmative Count Tiszas question whether in the case of a general mobilisation, the garrisons remaining in Transylvania for its safety, were sufficiently strong to ensure order in case of internal disturbances. The garrisons were *Landsturm*-formations, commanded by officers. An experienced general would take the command. These troops would certainly not be sufficiently strong to resist an attack on the part of the Roumanian army, but they could retard the advance of the Roumanian army. These troops were recruited in such a manner, that there were very few Hungarian Roumanians among them.

The Roy. Hungarian Premier was satisfied with this answer and declared that the Roy. Hungarian government would provide reinforcements of the gendarmes in Transylvania and he would, if necessary, send a Royal commissioner there, who would act jointly with the commander of the troops, to maintain order in Transylvania, where immediately after the mobilisation, the state of siege will be proclaimed.

On the proposition of the Imp. Roy. premier (Count Stürgkh) the question is discussed in principle, what should be done, if Italy sent an expedition to Valona.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) explains that he did not think such an action on Italys part at all probable, but that diplomatic measures against such an eventuality were being taken. Should Italy decide otherwise, the Imp. and Roy. government would *pro forma* have to share the undertaking; but it is too early to consider this eventuality seriously just now.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) then begged the council to vote the resolution, of which he had spoken at their last meeting, and from which the Royal Hungarian government made the whole action depend. The council of ministers must express unanimously that the action against Servia was not in any way connected with plans of aggrandisement on the part

of the monarchy, and that not any portion of Servia should be annexed, except slight frontier regulations, imposed by military considerations. He must absolutely insist that such a resolution be voted unanimously by the council.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) declared that he could not accept the Royal Hungarian Premier's point of view without certain reservations. In the present political situation, he was also of opinion that, should it come to war with Servia and we were the victors, we should annex no part of this country, but by making it surrender large portions of its territory to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, eventually to Roumania, reduce its size so much, that it would cease to be dangerous. The situation in the Balkans might change; it is not impossible that Russia should succeed in overthrowing the present cabinet in Sofia and appointing a government hostile towards us; Albania is no reliable factor as yet; he must, as manager of the foreign affairs of Austria-Hungary reckon with the possibility that after the war there might be circumstances which would make it impossible for us to renounce all annexation, if we are to improve our frontiers.

The Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) declared that he could not accept these reservations of Count Berchtold and must, in consideration of his responsibility as Hungarian Premier ask the conference to vote his point of view unanimously. He asks this not only from reasons basing on our home politics, but more particularly, because he is firmly convinced that Russia would resist *à outrance* if we were to insist upon the complete annihilation of Servia, and because he believes that the best card we hold for improving our international situation is to declare to the powers as early as possible, that we have no intention of annexing any territory whatever.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) declares that even before this discussion he had the intention of declaring as much in Rome.

The Imp. Roy. Premier (Stürgkh) expressed his belief, that even if the annexation of Servian territory remained out of the question, Servia might be made dependent upon the monarchy by the deposition of the dynasty by a military

convention and by other corresponding measures. Certainly the resolution of the council of ministers must not be voted in such a manner that corrections of the frontierlines, which might become necessary from a strategic point of view would have to be renounced.

The Imp. and Roy. War-minister (Krobatin) declared that he would vote the resolution on the condition, that besides corrections of the frontierlines the occupation of a bridge-head on the other side of the river Save, for instance in the Schabatz district, would be allowed. After this the following resolution was unanimously voted:

The Common Council of Ministers at the proposition of the Royal Hungarian Premier (Tisza) votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom contemplated. Of course the strategically necessary corrections of the frontierlines, or the reduction of Servias territory to the advantage of other states or the unavoidable temporary occupation of Servian territory is not precluded by this resolution.

The Minister in the Chair (Berchtold) mentions with gratification that on all points the council is perfectly agreed and closes the conference.

I have taken cognisance of
the contents of the protocol.

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

Francis Joseph m. p.

Clerk of the Council:

A. Hoyos m. p.

Berchtold m. p.

27.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

(Timed *demarche* in Belgrade.)

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

You are asked to present the following note to the Royal government on the afternoon of the 23rd July, not later than between four and five o'clock.

“On the 31st March 1909 the Royal Servian Minister at the court of Vienna by order of his government made the following declaration before the Imp. and Roy. government:

‘Servia acknowledges that none of its rights have been touched by the situation created in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it will therefore accomodate itself to the decisions which the powers will resolve with regard to the article XXV of the Treaty of Berlin. Servia, in following the advice of the Great Powers, pledges itself to give up the attitude of protest and resistance which it adopted since last October with regard to the annexation, and it pledges itself furthermore to change the course of its present policy towards Austria-Hungary and to live in future on terms of friendly and neighbourly relations.’

The history of latter years and especially the grievous events of the 28th June have given proofs of a subversive movement in Servia, whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin certain portions from the territory of Austria-Hungary. This movement, which has developed under the eyes of the Servian government, has resulted in acts of terrorism outside the frontier-lines of the kingdom, in a series of attempts at murder and in murders.

Far from keeping the formal promises given in the declaration of the 31st March 1909, the Royal Servian government has done nothing to suppress this movement. It tolerated the criminal doings of the diverse societies and associations directed against the monarchy, the outrageous language of the press, the glorification of the instigators of plots; it allowed officers and officials to take part in subversive plans, tolerated a most unhealthy propaganda in public instruction and gave permission for manifestations, which caused the Servian population to hate the monarchy and despise its organisation.

The toleration, of which the Servian government was guilty, lasted until the very moment when the events of the 28th June showed all the world the horrible consequences of such toleration.

The depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the plot of the 28th June prove, that the murder of Sarajevo was prepared in Belgrade, that the murderers had received the weapons and bombs, with which they were armed,

from officers and officials, belonging to the *Narodna odbrana* and that the conveyance of criminals and weapons to Bosnia had been prepared and carried through by Servian frontier organs.

The above-quoted results of the judicial inquiry do not permit the Imp. and Roy. government to keep up its attitude of patient observation, maintained for years in the face of criminal dealings, which emanate from Belgrade and thence spread to the territory of the monarchy. These results make it the duty of the Imp. and Roy. government to put an end to such doings, which are constantly threatening the peace of the monarchy.

To attain this end, the Imp. and Roy. government find itself obliged to demand from the Servian government an official assurance that it condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary and in their entirety the dealings whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin parts of the territory belonging to the monarchy and that it pledges itself to suppress with all the means in its power this criminal and terroris propaganda.

With a view to giving these assurances a solemn character, the royal Servian government will publish the following declaration on the first page of its official press-organ of the 26th/13th July:

The Royal Servian government condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, that is the entirety of the ambitions, whose ultimate aim it is to disjoin parts of the territory belonging to the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy and regrets sincerely the horrible consequences of these criminal ambitions.

The Royal Servian government regrets that Servian officers and officials have taken part in the propaganda above-mentioned and thereby imperilled the friendly and neighbourly relations, which the Royal government had solemnly promised to cultivate in its declaration of the 31st March 1909.

The Royal government, which condemns and rejects every thought and every attempt to interfere in behalf of the inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it a duty to warn officers, officials and indeed all the inhabitants of the

kingdom, that it will in future use great severity against such persons, as will be found guilty of similar doings, which the government will make every effort to suppress.'

This declaration will at the same time be communicated to the Royal army by an order of His Majesty the King, and will besides be published in the official organ of the army.

The Royal Servian government will overmore pledge itself to the following:

1. To suppress every publication likely to inspire hatred and contempt against the monarchy or whose general tendencies are directed against the integrity of the latter;

2. to begin immediately dissolving the society called: *Narodna odbrana*, to seize all its means of propaganda and to act in the same way against all the societies and associations in Servia, which are busy with the propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal government will take the necessary measures to prevent these societies continuing their efforts under another name or in another form;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction everything that serves or might serve the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, both where teachers or books are concerned;

4. to remove from military service and from the administration all officers and officials who are guilty of having taken part in the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names and the proofs of whose guilt the Imp. and Roy. government will communicate to the Royal government;

5. to consent that Imp. and Roy. officials assist in Servia in the suppressing of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy;

6. to have a judicial inquiry instituted against all those, who took part in the plot of the 28th June, if they are to be found on Servian territory; the Imp. and Roy. government will delegate organs who will take an active part in these inquiries;

7. to arrest without delay major Volja Tankosić and a certain Milan Giganović, a Servian government official, both compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. to take effective measures so as to prevent the Servian authorities from taking part in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier;

to dismiss from service and severely punish those organs of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica, who helped the perpetrators of the crime of Sarajevo to reach Bosnia in safety;

9. to give the Imp. and Roy. government an explanation of the unjustified remarks of high Servian functionaries in Servia as well as in foreign countries, who, notwithstanding their official positions, did not hesitate to speak in hostile terms of Austria-Hungary in interviews given just after the event of the 28th June;

10. to inform the Imp. and Roy. government without delay that the measures summed up in the above points have been carried out.

The Imp. and Roy. government expects the answer of the Royal government to reach it not later than Saturday, the 25th inst. at five in the afternoon.

A memorandum on the results of the investigation of Sarajevo, inasmuch as they refer to the functionaries mentioned in points 7. and 8. will be found enclosed."

Supplement.

The inquiry set on foot by the court of justice in Sarajevo against Gavrilo Princip and accomplices, guilty of and accessory to the murder committed on the 28th June, has up to the present time lead to the following conclusions:

1. The plan of murdering Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Sarajevo, was devised in Belgrade by Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Čabrinović, a certain Milan Ciganović and Trifko Grabež with the assistance of major Volja Tankosić.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols with their ammunition, which were the tools used by the murderers, were procured in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganović and by major Volja Tankosić and there handed to Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež.

3. The bombs are hand-granades, which come from the arms-dépôt of the Servian army in Kragujevac.

4. To make sure that the plot would succeed, Čiganović taught Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež the use of the granades

and in a wood near the rifle grounds of Topschider he taught Princip and Grabež the use of the Browning pistols.

5. To make it easy for Princip, Čabrinović and Grabež to cross the frontier of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to get their weapons through, Čiganović organised a system of transports.

The frontier-captains of Schabatz (Rade Popovic) and of Loznica, the customs officer Radivoj Grbic of Loznica and several other persons were all implicated in the transport of the criminals and their weapons to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

28.

**Letter from Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in
Belgrade.**

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

I have the honour to send your Excellency a few instructions with regard to the presentation of our demands to the Servian government, which the duties of your office do not comprise.

The demands are the very least we can ask, if our intolerable relations with Servia are to be placed on a better footing. We must overmore insist that the decision of the Servian government be communicated within the term of 48 hours and we could not on any account consent to a prolongation of the term, should the Servian government use the pretext that it wishes to judge the consequences that some of our demands might have.

We cannot enter into negotiations with Servia with regard to our demands, and cannot be satisfied with anything less than their unconditional acceptance within the stated term; otherwise we should be obliged to draw further consequences.

Should your Excellency be asked what further steps the Imp. and Roy. government will undertake after the diplomatic relations have been broken off, you will declare that you have no information on the subject.

On your own initiative and without stating that you have instructions to that effect, you can say that the hostile

attitude of the kingdom has, during the last few years, twice obliged us to incur heavy expenses for military measures and that, should this be again the case, we should certainly make the Servian government responsible for the costs of such measures.

I must beg your Excellency to avoid discussing the contents of the note and the interpretation of the single points and should Herr Pasić insist, you will declare that you have no authority to discuss the subject further, but must demand the acceptance *pure et simple* of the conditions. By word of mouth your Excellency will also ask Herr Pasić to let you have the Servian translation of the declaration, as published in the official gazette and the Servian text of the army-order, so that you may be certain that the translation is correct.

The telegram No. 67 of the 13th inst. and the private decree of November 28th 1912, No. 80,215 mentioned therein, give you the exact instructions of what you are to do in case diplomatic relations are broken off.

As soon as the term of 48 hours from the time of the presentation has expired without the announcement of the acceptance, your Excellency would in a note inform the Servian government that the stipulated term being over, you would, in accordance with your instructions, leave Serbia with the members of the legation and would entrust our country-people and our interests in Serbia to..... at the same time leaving the secretary of the chancery behind, who would be appointed to the in Belgrade.

After this our diplomatic relations might be considered as broken off.

After having carried out all the instructions contained in the decree No. 80,215 of the 28th November 1912, your Excellency will cross to Semlin with all the members of the legation.

I overmore beg your Excellency to inform me by cyphered telegram from Belgrade of the fact that Serbia refuses to comply with our demands, or that the stipulated term has expired. At the same time one of your gentlemen must be sent to Semlin, so that he can telegraph a direct message *in claris*.

It might perhaps be arranged that the gentleman in question could go to Semlin some time before, and could send his telegram on telegraphic notice from your Excellency.

29.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petersburg and Constantinople*).

(Timed *demarche* in Belgrade.)

Z. 3401—3406.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

To:

Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3401.

Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 3402.

Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 3403.

Count Mensdorff, London, No. 3404.

Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 3405.

Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 3406.

The Imp. and Roy. government found itself in the necessity of addressing the following note to the Royal Servian government through the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade on Thursday the 23rd inst:

"On the 31st March...." follows the text of Nr. 27 as far as: "... is enclosed in this note" **).

I have the honour to beg your Excellency to communicate the contents of this note to the government to which you are accredited, and to add the following comments:

On the 31st March 1909 the Royal Servian government made a declaration to Austria-Hungary, the text of which is given in the above ***).

But on the very day following this date Servia adopted a course of politics which had no other aim but to call forth subversive ideas in the minds of Austrian-Hungarian subjects

*) Compare the text in the Austrian-Hungarian Redbook No. 8 dated July 22, 1914.

**) Compare Page 59.

***) Compare Page 59.

of Servian nationality and to prepare the disjoining of certain portions of the territory of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.

Servia became the centre of criminal agitation.

Very soon societies and associations were formed, some of which were openly, some secretly organised to foster disorder and discontent on Austrian-Hungarian territory. These societies have among their members generals, diplomatists, government officials and judges — persons prominent in the official world of the Servian kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely sworn to the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes on which the Servian press-organs do not incite their readers to hatred and contempt for the neighbouring monarchy or encourage plots, which are more or less openly directed against its safety or integrity.

A great number of agents is instructed to keep up agitation against Austria-Hungary and to spread sedition amongst the youth of the frontier districts of both these countries.

The love of plotting, which is peculiar to Servian politicians, and whose bloody results can be traced in the annals of Servias history, has been stimulated by the last Balkan crisis; individuals, who belonged to the bands, hitherto busy in Macedonia, have joined the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these plottings, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian government has not thought fit to take a single measure. It has thereby neglected the duty imposed by the solemn declaration of the 31st March 1909 and has placed itself in opposition to the will of Europe and to the engagements taken towards Austria-Hungary.

The Imp. and Roy. government territorially unselfish, used the utmost patience in the face of this provoking attitude of Servia, hoping that the Servian government would at some time find out how valuable the friendship of Austria-Hungary was to its interests. The Austrian-Hungarian government, by observing a friendly attitude towards Servian interests, hoped that the time would come, when Servia would in its turn adopt a similar attitude towards her neighbour. Austria-

Hungary expected this evolution in the political ideas of Servia to take place, when after the events of 1912 the monarchy maintained its unselfish attitude, showing no resentment at the considerable aggrandizement of Servia.

The friendliness shown by Austria-Hungary to its neighbour did not however modify its attitude in the least degree, and Servia continued tolerating propaganda as before. The disastrous effects were seen by all the world on the 28th June, on the day when the heir to the throne of the monarchy and his august wife became the victims of a plot prepared in Belgrade.

In the face of this situation the Imp. and Roy. government finds itself compelled to take fresh and urgent steps in Belgrade, to induce the servian government to stop the incendiary movement, which threatens the safety and integrity of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy.

The Imp. and Roy. government is convinced that in undertaking this step it acts in accordance with the feelings of all civilised nations, which cannot tolerate, that the murder of princes of the blood should become a weapon, which may be used with impunity in political strife, or that the peace of Europe should incessantly be disturbed by the plotting carried on in Belgrade.

The Imp. and Roy. government is prepared to prove these assertions by a collection of documents showing the Servian plottings and proving their connection with the bloody deed of the 28th June, which it holds at the disposition of thegovernment.

The identical communication is being sent to the representatives of Austria-Hungary to the other Signatory Powers.

You are authorised to leave a copy of this instruction with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. s'est vu obligé d'adresser jeudi le 23 de ce mois, par l'entremise du Ministre I. et R. à Belgrade, la Note suivante au Gouvernement Royal de Serbie:

«Les 31 mars....» follows the text of No. 27 as far as: «..... annexée à cette Note.»*)

J'ai l'honneur d'inviter Votre Excellence de vouloir porter le contenu de cette Note à la connaissance du Gouvernement auprès duquel Vous êtes accrédité, en accompagnant cette communication du commentaire que voici:

Le 31 mars 1909 le Gouvernement Royal Serbe a adressé à l'Autriche-Hongrie la déclaration dont le texte est reproduit ci-dessus**).

Le lendemain même de cette déclaration la Serbie s'est engagée dans une politique tendant à inspirer des idées subversives aux ressortissants serbes de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et à préparer ainsi la séparation des territoires austro-hongrois, limitrophes à la Serbie.

La Serbie devint le foyer d'une agitation criminelle.

Des sociétés et affiliations ne tardèrent pas à se former qui, soit ouvertement, soit clandestinement, étaient destinés à créer des désordres sur le territoire austro-hongrois. Ces sociétés et affiliations comptent parmi leurs membres des généraux et des diplomates, des fonctionnaires d'Etat et des juges, bref les sommités du monde officiel et inofficiel du Royaume.

Le journalisme serbe est presque entièrement au service de cette propagande, dirigée contre l'Autriche-Hongrie, et pas un jour ne passe sans que les organes de la presse serbe n'excitent leurs lecteurs à la haine et au mépris de la Monarchie voisine ou à des attentats dirigés plus ou moins ouvertement contre sa sûreté et son intégrité.

Un grand nombre d'agents est appelé à soutenir par tous les moyens l'agitation contre l'Autriche-Hongrie et à corrompre dans les provinces limitrophes la jeunesse de ces pays.

L'esprit conspirateur des politiciens serbes, esprit dont les annales du Royaume portent les sanglantes empreintes, a subi une récrudescence depuis la dernière crise balcanique; des individus ayant fait partie des bandes jusque là occupées en Macédoine, sont venus se mettre à la disposition de la propagande terroriste contre l'Autriche-Hongrie.

*) Vide Page 67 - 71.

**) Vide No. 27.

En présence de ces agissements auxquels l'Autriche-Hongrie est exposée depuis des années, le Gouvernement de la Serbie n'a pas cru devoir prendre la moindre mesure. C'est ainsi que le Gouvernement Serbe a manqué au devoir que lui imposait la déclaration solennelle du 31 mars 1909, et c'est ainsi qu'il s'est mis en contradiction avec la volonté de l'Europe et avec l'engagement qu'il avait pris vis-à-vis de l'Autriche-Hongrie.

La longanimité du Gouvernement I. et R. à l'égard de l'attitude provocatrice de la Serbie, était inspirée du désintéressement territorial de la Monarchie austro-hongroise et de l'espoir que le Gouvernement Serbe finirait tout de même par apprécier à sa juste valeur l'amitié de l'Autriche-Hongrie. En observant une attitude bienveillante pour les intérêts politiques de la Serbie, le Gouvernement I. et R. espérait que le Royaume se déciderait finalement à suivre de son côté une ligne de conduite analogue. L'Autriche-Hongrie s'attendait surtout à une pareille évolution dans les idées politiques en Serbie lorsque après les événements de l'année 1912, le Gouvernement I. et R. rendit possible par une attitude désintéressée et sans rancune l'agrandissement si considérable de la Serbie.

Cette bienveillance manifestée par l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de l'Etat voisin n'a cependant aucunement modifié les procédés du Royaume qui a continué à tolérer sur son territoire une propagande, dont les funestes conséquences se sont manifestées au monde entier le 28 dr., jour, où l'héritier présomptif de la Monarchie et son illustre épouse devinrent les victimes d'un complot tramé à Belgrade.

En présence de cet état de choses le Gouvernement I. et R. a dû se décider à entreprendre de nouvelles et pressantes démarches à Belgrade afin d'amener le Gouvernement Serbe à arrêter le mouvement incendiaire menaçant la sûreté et l'intégrité de la Monarchie austro-hongroise.

Le Gouvernement I. et R. est persuadé qu'en entreprenant cette démarche, il se trouve en plein accord avec les sentiments de toutes les nations civilisées qui ne sauraient admettre que le régicide devint une arme dont on puisse se servir impunément dans la lutte politique, et que la paix

européenne fût continuellement troublée par les agissements partant de Belgrade.

C'est à l'appui de ce qui précède que le Gouvernement I. et R. tient à la disposition du Gouvernement..... un dossier élucidant les menées serbes et les rapports existant entre ces menées et le meurtre du 28 juin.

Une communication identique est adressée aux Représentants Impériaux et Royaux auprès des autres Puissances Signataires.

Vous êtes autorisé de laisser une copie de cette dépêche entre les mains de Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères.

Vienne, le 24 juillet 1914*).

30.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, Petersburg and Constantinople.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Adress:

1. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3426,
2. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 3427,
3. Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 3428,
4. Count Mensdorff, London, No. 3429,
5. Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 3430,
6. Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 3431.

1. Berlin.

When your Excellency on Friday, the 24th inst. personally informs the government of the enclosed official decree**), you will remark that the perfect political understanding with the German government already achieved, saves you the trouble of a confidential verbal explanation of our step in Belgrade.

*) This date corresponds to the change in the date of presentation of the Note.

**) Vide No. 29.

The reasons why we could not undertake the *demarche* in Belgrade before yesterday have been told Herr von Tschirschky verbally at the time, and your Excellency has communicated them to the German government from my telegram No. 234 of the 15th July*).

2. Rome.

Your Excellency will tender the enclosed official decree to the Royal Italian government; should Marquis di San Giuliano still be absent from Rome, to his representative, on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon. Your Excellency will not find verbal explanations necessary, since you will have seen the Marquis shortly before, and will have prepared him. But perhaps your Excellency will think it useful to call attention to the fact that the society *Narodna odbrana*, to which all the persons compromised in the plot of the 28th June belong as members, is a combative organisation spread all over Servia, whose activity, according to the authentic programme in our possession, now that Turkey no longer counts, is exclusively directed against our monarchy.

3. Paris.

The enclosed official decree which is to be communicated to the government, refers to the demands, which we are compelled to address to the Royal Servian government, to confine the movement in favour of Greater Servia. Your Excellency will tender the document to the government on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

The exposition of this document is so clear that it saves me the trouble to ask your Excellency to add a verbal explanation of the step we are taking with regard to Servia. Still it will be useful if your Excellency, in tendering this document, reminds the French government, that in all difficulties, which have arisen in European policy during latter years, France has always played the grateful part of a mediator between the discordant groups of powers.

*) That is on the 23rd July — the decree being ante-dated 24.

4. London.

Your Excellency will be good enough to tender the enclosed official decree to the State Secretary or his representative on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

Your Excellency might verbally explain upon this occasion that English policy and that of the monarchy in the near East, have during latter years most satisfactorily shown a converging tendency; reciprocal confidence has been reestablished and the British public (after a short period of vacillations, which is over), takes interest in the position of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power and gives its attention to life in the monarchy. The assassination of the Archduke-heir to the throne (of which the *dossier* is at the disposition of the Powers), has shown plainly what may be expected, if Servia is not compelled to break off all relations with political conspirators (such as the *Narodna odbrana*), whose threads reach to all the countries and territories of the monarchy. England, where so much indignation was shown when the servian King and his queen were murdered, will certainly understand that public opinion in the monarchy is crying out for atonement of the moral complicity and the criminal toleration of the Belgrade authorities. The enunciations of Servian diplomatists and officers prove that Servia does not as yet conceive the degree of abomination of the Sarajevo plot; every line printed on the subject in Belgrade papers proves the same, and more than anything, the fact that the Servian government has not yet moved a finger to seize the accomplices of the crime of the 28th June, who are still on Servian territory.

5. Petersburg.

Your Excellency will forward the enclosed official decree to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or to his representative on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

I beg your Excellency to add to the explanations of the document, the following verbal elucidations:

The Imp. and Roy. government feels no ill-will or grudge against Servia; as lately as 1912 the Imp. and Roy. government by its loyal and territorially disinterested attitude gave Servia a chance to become nearly twice the size it was before.

Even now the monarchy is undertaking this serious step in Belgrade only because its selfpreservation and its selfdefense demand as much.

All the Imp. and Roy. government asks, is to preserve its territory from the insurrectional miasm spreading from across the neighbouring kingdom and to put a stop to the indulgent toleration, with which the Royal Servian government has hitherto treated the efforts, which by word, script and deed were in Servia directed against the integrity of the monarchy.

The assassination of the archduke-heir to the throne naturally exhaust the patience of the Imp. and Roy. government with regard to Servian plotting. (The *dossier* on the crime, which is at the disposition of the Imperial government, shows the connection of the criminals with the society *Narodna odbrana*).

The murder of Sarajevo must at the same time strengthen the feeling of solidarity between the great monarchies whose common interest it is to defend themselves against the murder of monarchs, from whatever quarter it may come, or whoever suffers by it.

6. Constantinople.

Your Excellency will tender the enclosed official decree to the Minister of Foreign Affairs or to his representative on Friday the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

31.

**Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ministers in
Bucharest, Sofia, Athens, Cetinje and Durazzo.**

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Czernin, Bucharest, No. 3432,
2. Count Tarnowski, Sofia, No. 3433,
3. Herr von Szilassy, Athens, No. 3434,
4. Herr Otto, Cetinje, No. 3435.
5. Herr von Löwenthal, Durazzo, 3436.

Private.

1.

Bucharest.

(Count Czernin takes this with him Monday the 20th July.)

Your Excellency hereby receives enclosed the text of an official decree to the Imp. and Roy. representatives to the Signatary Powers*) who are instructed to tender them to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th July in the forenoon.

Your Excellency is authorised to communicate the contents of the decree strictly in private to His Majesty the King and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Friday the 24th inst.

As I have had an opportunity of verbally discussing the entire complex of questions connected with our *demarche* in Belgrade, your Excellency are in a position to give to His Majesty the King any elucidations he might demand on the results of our inquiry in Sarajevo, although the notes to the Great Powers are in themselves very explicit on the subject.

In your Excellencys conversation with His Majesty it will be useful to touch the chord on the many years faithful friendship, which connects the King with our own gracious Majesty, and call attention to the fact that the anarchist movement originating in Servia aims directly at the dynasty and its individual members.

2.

Sofia.

(Monday, July 20, evening by the Constantinople courier.)

You will find enclosed the text of an official decree to the representatives to the Signatary Powers which they are instructed to deliver to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th inst. in the forenoon.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of the decree to the government in Sofia on Friday, the 24th inst., and to take the necessary steps, so that His Majesty the King is also informed.

When you were last in Vienna, the Foreign Office informed you fully on our views with regard to the terrorist

*) Vide No. 29.

movement in Servia, so that I need not add anything to the explanations contained in the enclosed document.

But it will be useful if in your conversations with the Bulgarian statesmen you mention the fact that from Bulgaria we expect sympathetic understanding for the serious step we are compelled to take in Belgrade, and that it certainly lies in Bulgarias interest to wait in quiet and cold blood for the events which may follow.

3.

Athens.

A.

(Cyphered telegram July 24, a. m.)

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade yesterday, Thursday, 23rd inst., presented a note to the Royal Servian government, in which the latter is called upon to comply with a number of demands within 48 hours, which we were compelled to put forth, when the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo came to our knowledge, and we could no longer shut our eyes to the fact that we must put an end to the agitation in our southern frontier provinces, which originates in Belgrade.

This for your information and direction.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of this telegram privately to the Greek Premier and Herr Streit.

The text of our note of information to the Signatory Powers was sent to you in the despatch-box on Monday.

There is no objection to your making use of this document in your informations to the above-named Greek ministers.

B.

(Decree sent on Monday in the despatch-box.)

You will find enclosed a copy of the decree adressed to the Signatory Powers which our representatives are instructed te deliver on Friday, 24th inst. a. m. to the cabinets to which they are accredited.

4.

Cettinje.

(Monday, with despatch-box to Cattaro, arrives in Cattaro on Wednesday.)

You will find enclosed the text of a decree addressed to the Signatary Powers*) which our representatives will deliver to the respective cabinets on Friday 24th inst.

You are authorised to communicate the contents of the decree to His Majesty the King and the Minister of Foreign Affairs on Friday the 24th inst.

In your conversation with the King and the Minister you will call attention to the fact that in the matter of the plot of Sarajevo and the revolutionary agitation carried on in the monarchy, we know very well that there is a great difference between Servia and Montenegro, and that we are glad to testify to the fact that the inquiry on the crime of the 28th June has not revealed a single fact pointing to Montenegro.

We are convinced that Montenegros attitude in the face of the step we are compelled to undertake towards Servia, will be such as to decline all participation in the tendencies which have lead to the crime of the 28th June.

5.

Durazzo.

A.

(Cyphered telegram, July 24.

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade yesterday, Thursday, 23rd inst., presented a note to the Royal Servian government in which the latter was called upon to accept a number of demands within 48 hours, which we have been compelled to ask on the basis of the results of the Sarajevo inquiry, and also because the agitation in our southern provinces bordering on Servia has for years originated in Belgrade and must at last be stopped.

*) Vide No. 29.

This is for your information as to what can be said to the government in Durazzo. The decree with the text informing the Signatory Powers is on the way to you by Lloyd-steamer.

B.

(Decree by Lloyd July 27 *).

I am enclosing you a copy of the decree sent to the representatives with the Signatory Powers, which they will present to the respective cabinets on Friday, the 24th July so that you should be informed and know what to say from the 24th inst. onward.

32.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome and Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Address:

1. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 3437.
2. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 3438.

1.

We must count with the possibility that the Royal Italian government will, in the eventuality of a warlike complication between us and Servia, attempt to interpret article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty **) in a sense favourable to itself and will bring forward the compensation question.

*) Vide No. 29.

**) Article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty:

L'Autriche Hongrie et l'Italie, n'ayant en vue que le maintien autant que possible du statu quo territorial en Orient, s'engagent à user de Leur influence pour prévenir toute modification territoriale qui porterait dommage à l'une ou à l'autre des Puissances signataires du présent Traité. Elles se communiqueront à cet effet tous les renseignements de nature à s'éclairer mutuellement sur Leurs propres dispositions ainsi que sur celles d'autres Puissances. Toutefois dans le cas où, par suite des événements le maintien du statu quo dans les régions des Balkans ou des côtes et îles

You will find enclosed a private notice, which you will use as a line of action in case the Marquis di San Giuliano should in conversation allude to the Italian interpretation of the article above-mentioned.

2.

Your Excellency will find enclosed the copy of a private notice which I am sending to Herr von Mérey. It is to serve the ambassador as a line of action in case the Marquis of San Giuliano should take a warlike complication between us and Servia for a pretext to interpret article VII in a sense favourable to Italy and should bring forward the compensation question.

As it is just possible that the Italian government would ask the Berlin cabinet to support its interpretation of article VII and the German State Secretary might lay the subject before you, I am anxious that you should be in a position to support our point of view in the Wilhelmstrasse with the necessary energy.

Your Excellency is authorised to communicate the contents of the private notice, but only in case the State Secretary first refers to the subject and even then only verbally. In any other case the private notice is reserved for your Excellency's private knowledge only.

Private notice.

The war declaration to Servia, which may eventually become necessary, will not be made by Austria-Hungary with a view to territorial acquisitions. The monarchy has on the contrary no other aim in view, but the one explained in its

ottomanes dans l'Adriatique et dans la mer Egée deviendrait impossible et que, soit en conséquence de l'action d'une Puissance tierce soit autrement l'Autriche-Hongrie ou l'Italie se verraient dans la nécessité de le modifier par une occupation temporaire ou permanente de Leur part, cette occupation n'aura lieu qu'après un accord préalable entre les deux Puissances, basé sur le principe d'une compensation réciproque pour tout avantage, territorial ou autre, que chacune d'Elles obtiendrait en sus du statu quo actuel et donnant satisfaction aux intérêts et aux prétentions bien fondées des deux Parties.

note to the Belgrade government, not to allow the hostile propaganda nourished by the neighbouring kingdom to disturb its normal peaceful development.

Though the monarchy in a war with Serbia by no means thinks of the acquisition of land, still the nature of the war would be such as to place the basis of operations on Servian territory; should Serbia in the course of mobilisation or soon after operations have begun, decide for yielding and giving way, a provisory occupation of the country would have to be kept up as long as there are no guarantees for peace, or as long as the costs of mobilisation or of war, incurred through Servias refusal to comply with Austria-Hungarys demands, have not been payed by Serbia.

It would be mistaking the spirit of the Triple Alliance Treaty to interpret article VII in such a manner that the temporary occupation of territory belonging to a country, with which the monarchy is at war, should be made dependent upon an agreement with Italy, based upon compensation.

In the text of the treaty, article VII, in referring to the necessity in which Austria-Hungary or Italy might find themselves of changing the *status quo*, the expression is used *dans les régions des Balcons* and this might give occasion for the interpretation, that an expressed difference between the territory belonging to Turkey in the Balkans and the territory of the Balkan States not being made, the conditions of the article in question might apply to both.

The text of our agreement proves that this interpretation would be altogether unjustified.

After the words: *dans les Balcons* article VII continues: *des côtes et îles ottomanes dans l'Adriatique et dans la mer Egée*. The explicit enumeration of what belongs to Turkey cannot but signify that the islands and coasts belonging to some other state are not included in the determinations of the article in question, that the words: *dans les régions des Balcons* applies to Turkish territory only. If this were not so, a certainly not intentional differentiation would arise, since the article would provide that islands and coasts of Montenegro or Greece would be excepted, but portions of the interior would be included in the determinations of article VII.

The fact that the determinations of article VII only apply to territory under Ottoman dominion is furthermore proved by the passage in the same article referring to an eventual compensation. It is clear that were the occupation of any part of Turkish territory in question, either of the allied powers must allow the other to take part in the war and after a preliminary agreement consent to its occupying temporarily or permanently some determined object of compensation. This principle cannot be applied to a war between the monarchy and a Balkan state without territory on the coast, as long as some other Balkan state with a coast has not joined the enemy of the monarchy, when Italy might pretend to a compensation territory, which it might reach by sea.

The text of the *Arrangement spécial concernant le Sandjak de Novi Bazar* of the year 1909 also shows plainly what is meant by *les régions des Balcons* in article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty. This arrangement, which was made for the express purpose of supplementing and giving preciseness to article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, says: the determinations of article VII apply to the Sandjak of Novi Bazar just as much as to the other parts of Turkey. When in the following sentence, beginning: *Si donc* there is question of the *maintien du statuquo dans les Balcons* there can be no doubt that in this case, and indeed in all the Treaty, *les Balcons* refers to the territory which Turkey owns in the Balkans.

If we wish to speak of the spirit in which the Treaty is written, it will suffice to quote the words on the: *bienfaits que leur garantit, au point de vue politique et social, le maintien de la Triple Alliance*, to make it clear that the monarchy cannot expect Italy to interpret the Treaty in a way, which would make its action against Servia difficult, whereas its principal aim is to stop hostile propaganda, which does not even recoil from murder.

Attention should also be paid to the fact, that according to the spirit of article VII, it was then considered desirable that the *status quo* of that time should be maintained, and all territorial changes avoided, which would be to the disadvantage of either Austria-Hungary or Italy. Since then there have been such changes and all in disfavour of the monarchy.

The aggrandisement of Servia at the expense of Turkey, has encouraged the old idea of a Greater Servia to such a degree that the monarchy's quiet development of its territory is threatened and it must, to defend its most vital interests resort to the use of arms. Though there can be no doubt that if the monarchy, intending to change the *status quo* of Turkey or of the territory which belonged to Turkey when the Treaty was concluded, would have to come to an understanding with Italy before undertaking serious steps,—it is also quite clear that the monarchy must have a free hand to protect its interests, where a change of the *status quo* has taken place without its cooperation.

The right of temporarily occupying territory in neighbouring Servia to ensure peace in its own country, cannot be disputed, and indeed there is no question of an action undertaken with the purpose of changing the *status quo*.

Nor should we understand Italy, if it founded its opposition against our action with regard to Servia, on the words with which article VII concludes and which are: *donnant satisfaction aux intérêts et aux prétensions bien fondées des deux Parties* and chose to speak of an injury to its interests, if we temporarily occupied any part of Servia. We could understand that such arguments might be used by the foes of the Triple Alliance, who are keeping the monarchy busy with the doings of the South-slav propaganda and will see a failure of their own, if Servia is checkmated.

33.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 842.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Strictly private.

(To be decyphered by a counsellor of the embassy.)

Received your Excellency's telegram No. 523 *).

From a private reliable source we have learnt that from the German side, probably through your German colleague, our

*) Vide No. 24.

intention of energetic steps against Serbia, previously arranged with Germany, have been communicated to Marquis di San Giuliano. He immediately sent instructions to Italian representatives in Petersburg and Bucharest, instructing them to use by-ways for inducing the respective governments to threaten Berlin and Vienna and prevent the action against Serbia.

I need not say that any attempts at intimidation would be without effect upon us.

Herr von Tschirschky to-day showed himself very depressed on account of news from the *entourage* of San Giuliano, who in consequence of strongly pessimistic reports from the Duke of Avarna is exceedingly anxious about public opinion and cannot promise to continue his policy of true friendship.

The above for your Excellency's exclusively private information.

34.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 843.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

Strictly private.

According to your telegram No. 523 you will meet the Marquis di San Giuliano to-morrow. Your Excellency might hold something like the following discourse. You have as yet received no precise information on the results of the inquiry in Sarajevo, nor on the steps we intend taking in Belgrade in consequence. But I had given you to understand that there was sufficient material, and that Servian plotting which had been carried on for years, would compel us to use very serious language in Belgrade. Your Excellency had been instructed to communicate this to the Marquis di San Giuliano and to add that while we were taking these steps in Belgrade, we considered a peaceful solution of the affair as quite possible. That at any rate we were convinced that in obtaining clearness in our relations with Serbia, we might count upon the loyalty of Italy and upon its faith as an ally. Marquis di San Giuliano in just appreciation of the international situation, repeatedly told you that what Italy wanted, was a strong Austria-Hungary and he said as much to me in Abbazia. That

it is absolutely necessary to clear up the dubious circumstances in Serbia, if the present situation of the monarchy is to be maintained, as well as the present strength of the Triple Alliance, on whose firmness the peace of Europe and its equilibrium depends. At the present moment Italys interests demand that it should openly side with us. It is therefore most important that the minister should in good time get Italian public opinion inspired to support the Triple Alliance and adhere to it when the news of our *demarche* in Belgrade reaches the Italian government.

In the course of the discussion, which might eventually follow, your Excellency might express the opinion as your own, that should peaceable means fail, the Vienna cabinet was far from thinking of a war with a view to conquest, or the annexation of any part of Serbia. Perhaps this is an opportunity for setting right the antagonistic report of the *Temps* that we were about to take the Lovcen by surprise. On the contrary we should be very much obliged to the Italian government, if it would use its influence in Cetinje and induce Montenegro, whose attitude is very different from that of Serbia and where bombs, exported from Serbia have played a part already, to keep quite quiet, while we hold our converse with Belgrade.

35.

Discourse between Count Berchtold and the German Ambassador.

Daily report No. 3425.

Vienna, July 20, 1914.

The German Ambassador came to me on the 20th July and according to instructions received, informed me that Berlin was exceedingly anxious on account of the attitude of Italy in face of the action we were planning against Serbia.

Ambassador von Flotow had reported on the 15th inst. that all those, who surrounded Minister di San Giuliano were disquieted because of the pessimistic reports sent by the duke of Avarna. San Giuliano avoided conversing on the subject with Flotow; Luzzatti and others in the confidence of the minister had expressed a belief that if Austria-Hungarys

demands went too far, the monarchy would put itself in the wrong and could not count upon the support of Italy.

On the 16th inst. Flotow had announced that San Giuliano had consulted Fusinato on the subject, who had declared that a foreign state can only be made responsible for common crimes and certainly not for political propaganda. The murder of the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary was not committed by Servian subjects and could not therefore be the ground of reclamations.

The Italian minister of foreign affairs therefore declared that Italy could not take active part in a policy suppressing the national idea. There had been repeated differences between Vienna and Rome, ever since Prince Hohenlohe had issued the Trieste decrees, which had caused such painful surprise all over Italy, and had produced a feeling against Austria-Hungary, which it would be vain to combat. He sees so many dark points on the horizon of our reciprocal relations, that he almost despairs of the success of his effort to maintain a friendly understanding. He fears that Italy will not be able to support the Austrian reclamations, without putting itself in direct opposition to the deeprooted principles of the Italian people.

In the face of this information Herr von Jagow comes to the conclusion that not only will the action of Austria-Hungary meet with no sympathy in Italy, but may eventually call forth direct resistance. The German State-Minister therefore urgently advises us to seek an understanding with Italy and at the same time expresses the opinion, that an Italian action against Valona (though Italy has at present no such intentions and would but unwillingly undertake it, if forced thereto *à titre de compensation*) might avert Italys attention from our Servian action.

In my answer to all this, I said first of all that it was much to be regretted that Italy had apparently already obtained knowledge of our plans against Servia. As not the slightest hint had been made to the Italian ambassador, the information had certainly not come to Rome from Vienna.

The assurance of Herr von Tschirschky that no communication on the subject had been made on Germanys part, I parried with the remark that perhaps Flotow might have

said something on his own responsibility. I said overmore that such confidences to Italy, from whichever side they may have been made, were exceedingly objectionable, also that I already had proofs that Italy was at the time busy counteracting against us. I could not therefore make my mind up to an early exchange of ideas with the Italian government on the subject of our action in Serbia, and this was what had been agreed upon between Under State-Secretary Zimmermann and Count Hoyos in Berlin. We had agreed to inform the cabinet of Rome one day previously to the tendering of the note in Belgrade and this seemed sufficient courtesy towards so unreliable an ally as Italy.

I then referred to the fact that by a resolution voted in the council of ministers it had been decided that no Servian territory should be annexed, so that Italian demands of compensation, even if they would be put forth on the interpretation of article VII, would become extinct of themselves. As to Valona, public opinion is so very strongly against Italy settling on the coast of the Adriatic opposite to its own, especially near the straits of Otranto, that I could never consent to any transactions on this point.

I also suggested to Herr von Tschirschky to get Berlin to call the Marquis di San Giuliano's attention to the contradiction in his assurances, that Italy required a strong Austria-Hungary as a wall of defence against Slavism and in his policy at critical times, which brings him into contact with the chief power of Slavism, Russia, and prevents Austria-Hungary from keeping intact its possessions.

I concluded by saying, that after all we could not allow ourselves to be intimidated by such news from Italy and could not deviate from the path we had begun to tread. We must keep to our purpose all the more, because from the reports of our Ambassador at the Quirinal, I see that in consequence of the Lybian campaign, Italy is by no means eager for battle, and may express its indignation in words, but will scarcely follow them up with deeds.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 76.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

According to the newspapers, Premier Pasič has gone to East-Servia on election business and will not return to Belgrade before the end of the week.

If these news are confirmed it will be necessary that your Excellency on Thursday morning, sends to the first official of the Servian Foreign Office a letter by someone from the Chancellor's office, stating that you are instructed to communicate important news to the Servian government on Thursday afternoon and would call at the Foreign Office between 4 and 5 o'clock. You will write that your communication will probably make a speedy return of Herr Pasič necessary; the temporary Chief of the Foreign Office had better, if he thought it necessary, communicate immediately with the Premier.

To avoid mistakes I should like it to be understood that this letter must be regarded in the light of an act of courtesy on your part, to facilitate the early return and the information of the Premier. But the presentation of the note must under all circumstances take place on Thursday afternoon between four and five o'clock, and should Herr Pasič be absent, the document must be given either to his representative or to the official next in rank in the Servian Foreign Office.

When the note has been delivered, your Excellency will inform me in the most urgent manner, by previously prepared cyphered telegrams *in duplo* from Belgrade and from Semlin by a member of the legation, whom you will send there on receipt of this telegram. I am anxious to have the news here on Thursday before 7 or 8 o'clock, for publication and other measures to be taken.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Report No. 131—P.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

Private.

I have been here for some time after the disastrous crime of the 28th June and I believe I can judge the general feeling entertained in this country.

Before the plot and indeed ever since the crisis connected with the annexation, the relations between the monarchy and Servia were on the part of the latter, poisoned by national chauvinism, hatred and a most effective propaganda of the aspirations of Greater Servia in those among our provinces, where Servians live. Since the last two Balcan wars the success of Servia has caused chauvinism to reach a climax, resembling paroxism, whose mad outbursts may be everywhere observed.

You will spare me proofs and examples, they are to be had everywhere and always, in political society as well as among the low people, whatever party these represent. I assume that it is a well-known axiom, that Servias policy aims first at disjoining the provinces inhabited by South-slavs and later on at the annihilation of the monarchy as a Great Power.

No one, who is constrained to spend one week in this political *milieu* will fail to recognise this truth.

The latest events which have influenced public feeling in this country, — the plot in Sarajevo, the death of Hartwig and the electioneering campaign, — though so different in themselves, in their causes and aims, have all had the same effect, they have deepened the hatred against the monarchy and have increased the contempt felt for it.

The murder of Sarajevo strengthened the belief of the Servians — long entertained — that the Habsburg states would now fall asunder, that the south-slav provinces would be disjoined, that revolution would break out in Bosna and Herzegowina, that the Slav regiments could no longer be relied upon. All nationalist madness seemed justified and could be put into a system.

The Servians believe this detested Austria-Hungary to be powerless, and scarcely worth waging a war with — hatred is supplemented by contempt. A disabled body, it will fall to the share of Greater Serbia, so soon to be realised.

Newspapers, which are far from being the most radical, in their daily articles comment the impotence and decay of the neighbouring monarchy and sully all its organs and institutions, beginning with the venerable person of the monarch, without fear of being as much as reprimanded. Even the government organ has attributed the crime of Sarajevo to the present conditions of the Empire. Our *prestige* is trodden under feet. There is no longer any fear of being responsible for what one says or does. The Servian people receives its education from the press; and its policy depends entirely on which party-press is uppermost. The propaganda in favour of Greater Serbia is the fruit of this education and its latest result is the crime of Sarajevo.

Herr Pasić gave a representative of the *Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten* an interview and some of the remarks it contains, cannot, in the mouth of a premier be qualified otherwise than as most impudent. The interview was "partly" denied, but in the meantime it has done its work and its phraseology reproduces the mind and expressions of Pasić so completely as to leave no doubt that the interview was honest.

Pasić has used the same arguments in the electioneering campaign to avoid being suspected of giving way to Austria-Hungary. This proves that all parties are agreed in hating the monarchy and are all equally convinced of its impotency.

I pass over the mad accusations and denunciations after the death of Hartwig which the *Times* calls *insane*, and also over the press campaign, redolent with lies and vulgarity, which however has the effect, that the government and the representatives of Austria-Hungary are considered as outlaws by the public and may with impunity be called murderers, ragamuffins, infamous Austrians etc.

All this vulgarity extends even to the members of the Imperial House, as is proved by the forged letter of the countess Lonyay, published in the *Zion*.

The political world of Servia, understanding the irreparable loss, which the death of Hartwig has caused, is now devoting itself to a fanatical cult of the deceased, in which not only gratitude for past favours is shown, but the fear for the future. Slavish submission towards Russia is the chief note sounded, to make sure of its goodwill in times to come.

The electioneering campaign unites all parties in one chorus of hostility against Austria-Hungary. Not one of the parties aspiring to power, will allow the suspicion to arise, that it might harbour weakness towards the monarchy. The pass-word of the election campaign is therefore war to the knife with Austria-Hungary.

The present military weakness of Servia, caused by the instability in New-Servia, which demands heavy sacrifices, is, if not overlooked altogether by experienced politicians, still regarded as a *quantité négligeable*, for the reason that Austria-Hungary is regarded as altogether impotent and incapable of energetic action. The serious words of warning, which have been spoken on our side are taken as "bluff", otherwise some measures of preparation would have been taken in the army, and the reserves would not be dismissed in small groups without arms from New-Servia to Old-Servia, or the arrangements for the mobilisation of the second summons, would not be neglected. News of a contrary line of action are not confirmed.

The fact that the Imp. and Roy. War-minister and the Chief of the Staff have gone on leave, have been taken as a proof that Austria-Hungary's weakness is quite evident.

The fear, felt immediately after the crime of Sarajevo, that the monarchy might raise strong claims, begins to vanish, since the inquiry has taken a prolonged course and the expected step on Austria-Hungary's part has not been taken and will soon be remembered as a bad dream, which disappears on awakening.

I have taken the liberty to appeal to your Excellency's patience at some length, not because in what I had to tell, I imagined giving you news, but because I needed this exposition of facts before I could come to the unavoidable conclusion that a settling of accounts with Servia, a war for the

prestige and position of the monarchy, indeed for its very existence, cannot be avoided for any length of time.

Whether we ought to wage this war now, or whether we ought to wait, until Servia has recovered from its two wars and Russia would be prepared to send not ten, as at present, but twenty army-corps on a war-footing against us, so that we should fight under much more unfavourable circumstances, is not for me to decide, or even to give an opinion upon.

To one, who is far from the centre, where all threads meet, it would seem that the present moment is most favourable and that the situation at home as well as abroad, offers opportunities, such as the epoch may not offer again.

The murder of Sarajevo has thrown the diverging aims of the peoples and countries of the monarchy in the background and has given us a happy moral position, estimated as such all over Europe.

If we neglect this opportunity, we make ourselves guilty of the difficulties and the untoward circumstances, which are sure to arise, when the day comes for the war, which must be fought out sooner or later.

To the local observer and the representative of the interests of Austria-Hungary in Servia, the question — quite apart from the general political situation of the world, which he cannot and may not judge—is clear that we cannot expose ourselves to see our *prestige* lessened and damaged more than it is already. We must—if we have not the power, the opportunity or the will for a general cleaning day on a large scale—not delay showing Servia how patient, how peace-loving, how generous we are. Our excuse will be that we are the stronger of the two. In this case we should have to be content with an apparent success. A lasting improvement of the situation we should not gain in this way, but we might save appearances.

If at some later period we should make peaceful manoeuvres, Servia would take this as a proof of our weakness; the uncertainty of our policy would estrange our allies, our foes would feel more contempt than ever for our forces.

If on the contrary we are resolved to put far-reaching demands in an effective form and under our control—which alone could get over the Servian plotting system—we must overlook all possible consequences and from the very beginning have the strong and firm will to carry out our plans to the end.

The principle of non-interference or of intervention when a perfect understanding had been arrived at between all the Great Powers, was guilty of the Balkan wars. The only thing which can serve is the selfdependent action of the power which alone is threatened, under the motto: "who is not with me, is against me". It is my belief that this alone could overthrow the enemy who has stood up before us in a threatening attitude, and could give the Empire peace for a number of years.

Half measures, putting forth demands, with long discussions to follow, and a rotten compromise at the end, would be the heaviest blow Austria-Hungary's *prestige* in Servia and its position as a Great Power in Europe could experience.

The Imp. and Roy. minister:
(signed) *Giesl*.

38.

Visit of the German Ambassador in the Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3444.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador according the instructions from Berlin, to-day communicated a telegram from Herr von Jagow, according to which the Royal Servian representative in Berlin, no doubt instructed by a circular to all the Servian representatives, declared to the State-Secretary that Servia intended maintaining the best and most correct relations with the neighbouring monarchy and was prepared to comply with all Austria-Hungary's demands after a strict inquiry in Sarajevo, inasmuch as the kingdom's honour and sovereignty allowed this.

The Royal Servian representative had at the same time requested the German government to use its influence with the Vienna cabinet in a conciliatory sense.

Herr von Tschirschky added that Herr von Jagow had told the Servian representative that according to the opinion of the German government, Servia's attitude towards Austria-Hungary had of latter years lacked correctness and neighbourliness to such a degree that it would be but natural if the Vienna cabinet in putting forth its demands, would use very energetic language.

39.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 271.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

According to the document of yesterday No. 3426 the enclosed decree could not be laid before this government before the morning of the 24th inst. *)

It is my humble opinion that the contents of the decree must absolutely be communicated to this government immediately, that is, before the other governments are informed, strictly in private for the present. I am confirmed in this opinion by a remark which the State-Secretary made during my visit to him to-day, when he asked me whether I had yet received information from Vienna on the contents of the note to be sent to Belgrade. He had been informed by Herr von Tschirschky that the note was to be presented on the 23rd inst. and he thought that he might expect the allied German government to be informed earlier than the other cabinets of the contents of the note and the modalities of the step in Belgrade.

At the same time Herr von Jagow told me that he had reliable information that the President of the French Republic would not leave Kronstadt until Thursday at ten o'clock.

*) Vide No. 30.

40.

Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 273.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Strictly private.

State-secretary to-day read a telegram to me from the German Ambassador in Rome, containing the following:

Marquis di San Giuliano hat told him, he did not believe that Epirotes would attack Valona; should this however be the case, he, San Giuliano, would try to bring about a common action of Italy and Austria-Hungary against the Epirotes; he would always try to act in accord with Austria-Hungary, but his good intentions might be frustrated by the Servian question.

41.

Letter from Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

Berlin, July 21, 1914.

Dear Count,

In my telegram of today No. 271*) I had the honour to inform your Excellency that according to my humble opinion it will be absolutely necessary to communicate the note to be presented in Servia on the 23rd inst. earlier, that is as soon as possible to the cabinet of Berlin, and later to the other governments.

Emperor William and all the others in high offices, from the very first promised to support our action in the most loyal manner and I cannot help feeling that it might give offence, if we informed all the cabinets at the same time of what our note to Servia contains, thus placing the German government, our ally on the same footing with the governments of the other Great Powers.

*) Vide No. 39.

I trust firmly that your Excellency will authorise me to give the information in question to this government without further delay (supplement to the decree No. 3425, private, of the 20th inst. *).

The State-Secretary today again began to speak of the attitude of Italy in the eventuality of a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

He said that having known the Italians for many years he was afraid that in our conflict with Servia, they might become unreliable (My telegram No. 1273 strictly private, of to-day. **)

Herr von Jagow thinks, though he does not mean it as advice, that if it comes to a warlike complication with Servia, we ought to communicate our intentions in confidential discourse to Italy.

If we explained from the beginning. — Herr von Jagow does not consider this a very desirable plan — that we only planned a temporary occupation of Servian territory, Italy might be satisfied. If we confessed to the contrary the usual compensation demands would immediately be put forward, and on these it would be best to come to an understanding at once.

As Herr von Jagow during this purely academic discourse repeatedly assured me that he had not been spoken to on the subject by Italy and as he did not even mention the interpretation of article VII of the Triple Alliance Treaty, I refrained from making use of the private decree No. 3438 of the 20th inst. as your Excellency instructed me ***).

Before concluding, I should like to call attention to the fact that the State-Secretary gave me to understand clearly, that of course Germany would stand by us with all its forces, but that for this very reason it is of vital interest to the German government to be informed in good time "where our way leads us", and most especially whether we planned a temporary occupation of Servian territory or whether, as Count

*) Vide No. 30.

**) Vide No. 40.

***) Vide No. 32.

Hoyos had hinted in his last conversation with the Imperial Chancellor, we considered the distribution of Servia as the *ultima ratio*.

With the expression of my deepest respect for your Excellency

(signed) *Szögyény*.

42.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 848.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Pertains to the decree No. 3437 of the 20th inst. which reaches you by courier*). If your Excellency should be induced by the Marquis di San Giuliano to make use of the arguments defending our interpretation of article VII as exposed in the notice, and the Minister maintains his point of view, it will be desirable that you do not continue the discussion on this subject, and justify yourself to the minister by saying that neither of you would succeed in making the other accept any interpretation but his own. That your Excellency believed that it would be in the interests of both, instead of carrying on a juridical discussion on the interpretation of an article, to discuss the great interests of Austria-Hungary and Italy as friends and allies.

I must add for your Excellency's information that I should take it as a grave symptom if the discussion of article VII led to irritation on either side, which might endanger the existence of the entire treaty.

*) Vide No. 32.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 525.

Rome, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Referring to your Excellency's telegram of the 20th inst. No. 843*). Conversation with Marquis di San Giuliano took place this afternoon.

The Minister showed himself much preoccupied by our *demarche* in Belgrade. I spoke at length in the sense of the first part of the above-quoted telegram. Marquis di San Giuliano listened attentively and made some notes. A lengthy discussion followed, during which I made use of the remarks at the conclusion of the telegram in question.

With regard to our relations with Servia the Minister again explained at length, that we would not obtain any favourable results by humiliation or violence, but much sooner by a conciliatory attitude. For a nationally mixed state like the monarchy, this was the only possible policy, and it had served us well with Germans and Poles. I told him that this reasoning, often discussed between us, was mere theory and false besides. In reality things look quite otherwise. I reminded him of all we had done for Servia since the Berlin Treaty; of our conciliatory attitude during the Balcan war and how the pan-servian offensive regularly grew more violent.

Italy, the Minister continued, wishes for a strong Austria, *but such as it is now*, without territorial aggrandisement. Any change of this sort — he must tell me in all sincerity — would be considered as damaging to Italy, whose policy was one of conciliation and perfect equilibrium. The Minister received my assurances that we intended no territorial annexation with visible satisfaction, the remark with regard to the Lovcen with ill-disguised triumph. He asked whether he might make use of these assurances in the press, and I not only answered in the negative, but told him that in my confidential information I was saying that there was *no intention* of territorial acquisition but not an *engagement*. (As the possibility of war

*1) Vide No. 34.

exists and the eventuality of Montenegro making common cause with Serbia, I should consider it dangerous to make further promises.)

Marquis di San Giuliano then declared that it was his determined intention to support us, if our demands of Serbia are such that they can legitimately be complied with. In any other case he would have the whole country against him, which is undeniably liberal, loves to remember its own revolutionary origin and sympathises with irredentist manifestations, wherever they show themselves. He gave me to understand that we could make it much easier for him, if our *demarche* in Belgrade was founded — if not exclusively — still for the most part upon the catastrophe of Sarajevo and not so much on political agitation in general.

I argued against all these reservations, which I called mistaken from a theoretical point of view (since they placed Serbia on the footing of a modern cultured state). From a practical point of view they showed, too little friendship and solidarity.

With regard to the press, the minister promised his support, within the limits of his reservations; but he could certainly not do anything in this direction before he had knowledge of the contents of our note to Belgrade.

He promised to send instructions in the sense we desired, to Montenegro this very day. He had already advised Belgrade in a conciliatory sense, and with a view to giving this advice more weight.*) had recalled the minister.

Finally the minister remarked that his confidence in our moderation towards Serbia was principally based upon the wisdom of our monarch, to which I replied, that he might for the same reason be convinced, that whatever our note to Serbia contained, it had been carefully considered and found to be absolutely necessary.

The general impression I received from this interview, was that of much friendly phraseology and quite as many

*) Here the cypher is illegible.

mental reservations; that the minister does not for the present apprehend war, but believes that Serbia will give way, founding his belief on the intense diplomatic influence the powers will exercise over Vienna and Belgrade.

44.

**Visit of the German Ambassador in the Imp. and Roy.
Foreign Office.**

Daily report Nr. 3443.

Vienna, July 21, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador during to-days visit said that his government had been informed that Marquis di San Giuliano was in great excitement with regard to the intended step of Austria-Hungary against Serbia.

But he—Tschirschky—recently had a conversation with the Duke of Avarna, who had expressed his conviction that the Italian government would loyally fulfil its duties as an ally in the quarrel between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and would stand on Austrias side, even if the public in Italy objected and raised its voice to the contrary.

45.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 148.

Petersburg, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

President Poincaré to-day received the diplomatic corps, every ambassador separately in the presence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Viviani and the French Ambassador Paléologue.

To me the President expressed his sympathy regarding the plot of Sarajevo in warm words and then passed on to political subjects, asking after the situation in Albania, on which the conversation dwelt for some time. Then he inquired after the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, remarking that in Serbia disquiet was felt, and asking what were the opinions in our country? I said that we were regarding the

situation with equanimity, because we were convinced that Serbia would not refuse what we thought right to ask. The next question was, what were the demands we intended addressing to Serbia, and to this I answered that the inquiry was still being carried on, and that I was not informed with regard to the results.

Monsieur Poincaré then delivered a kind of lecture, using all his oratorical powers and explained that to make a government responsible for anything was only admissible when there were concrete proofs against it, otherwise a *démarche* of this kind would be a mere pretext, and this he could not suppose Austria-Hungary to be guilty of, in the case of such a small country. At any rate one must not forget that Serbia has friends and that a situation might be created, which might become dangerous to peace. I confined myself to a quiet and precise answer, remarking that up to a certain degree every government is responsible for everything that happens on its territory. The president sought to refute this thesis, by constituting analogous cases between other states, so that I could not but say that all depended upon circumstances and that analogies and generalisations did not serve. In the course of the conversation, Monsieur Poincaré made a concealed allusion to the alleged "Prohaska case" to which I made a fitting reply.

He closed the conversation by expressing the wish that the results of the inquiry might be such as not to give cause for disquiet.

If we consider that this tactless behaviour, which was almost threatening, was observed by the head of a foreign state, staying here on a visit, and if we compare it to the reserved, cautious attitude of Herr Sazonow, we cannot certainly expect that the French president used any calming influence in this country. It is certainly remarkable that the juridical deductions of Monsieur Poincaré bear some similarity to the excursions of Herr Pasič in the "*Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten*". Herr Spalajkovic, whom Herr Sazonow quite recently qualified as "déséquilibré" probably had a hand in this.

My colleagues of the Triple Alliance did not mention whether Monsieur Poincaré spoke to them of Serbia.

46.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Telegram without a number.

Ischl, July 21, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

For Baron Macchio.

His Majesty the Emperor and King has approved the text of the note to Servia and to the powers, without any change. I beg your Excellency to inform the German ambassador that the note cannot be handed to him before to-morrow morning, because some corrections have to be made.

47.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 249.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Your Excellency's telegram No. 271*) received.

The decree of the 20th July No. 3426**) in Germany's case was a mere form: the official delivery of our note was to take place in Berlin under the same modalities as in the case of the other Signatory Powers.

In strict privacy we communicated the note in question (which contains the text of the note to Servia) to Herr von Tschirschky yesterday; the ambassador has no doubt by this time forwarded it to Berlin.

*) Vide No. 39.

**) Vide No. 30.

Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény in Berlin.

Telegram No. 250.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Accompanying the decree*) which Herr von Mérey received on the 20th inst. I sent him a private notice to this effect**):

“If your Excellency should be induced by the Marquis di San Giuliano to make use of the arguments defending our interpretation of article VII, as exposed in the notice, and the minister maintains his point of view, it will be desirable that you do not continue the discussion on this subject, and justify yourself to the minister by saying that neither of you would succeed in making the other accept any interpretation but his own. That your Excellency believed that it would be in the interests of both, instead of carrying on a juridical discussion on the interpretation of an article, to discuss the great interests of Austria Hungary and Italy as friends and allies.

I must add for your Excellencys information that I should take it as a grave symptom if the discussion of article VII led to irritation on either side which might endanger the existence of the entire treaty.”

This is for your Excellencys exclusive personal information. Should Herr von Jagow allude to the question of the interpretation you will make use of the same arguments remarking that a discussion between us and Italy on the interpretation of article VII had better be avoided at the present moment. When Italy occupied certain islands in the Aegean Sea, we could, according to our way of seeing, have demanded compensation, but we preferred observing the friendly attitude of an ally and did not hinder Italys action.

*) Vide No. 32.

**) Vide No. 32.

Count Berchtold to Herr von Mérey in Rome.

Telegram No. 852.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

With my telegram of the 20th inst. No. 843*).

As a sequel to the communications you have made to the Marquis di San Giuliano I beg you to inform him privately that our *demarche* in Belgrade has now been fixed for Thursday the 23rd inst. in the afternoon.

The note, which Baron Giesl is instructed to present to the Servian government contains a number of demands referring to the restraining of the movement which threatens our territory, which we found upon the results of the inquiry of Sarajevo, feeling that we must put an end to the agitation in our southern frontier countries and which originates in Belgrade. We have allowed the Servian government 48 hours time, to accept our conditions, because we feared Servias usual mode of procrastination. — The Signatory Powers would receive the communication on Friday the 24th inst. and Your Excellency will be in a position on the same day to give the Italian government official information on our *demarche* in Belgrade. The step you are taking to-day is limited to Rome, Berlin and Bucharest, out of special consideration for the Alliance.

I must ask your Excellency to make the communication contained in this telegram personally to the Marquis di San Giuliano (if this is not possible, to his representative) not before Thursday afternoon. We wish absolutely to avoid that the news should reach Petersburg from Rome on the same day.

*) Vide No. 34.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 528.

Rome, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

With telegram of the 15th inst. No. 820*). Your Excellency authorised me to communicate our *démarche* in Belgrade to Marquis di San Giuliano one day earlier and promised to send the dates by telegram. As the fact of the *démarche* was generally known, this instruction could only refer to the *contents* of the note.

This instruction has not been annulled, and now I see to my regret from the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3427**) just arrived by courier, that though our *démarche* in Belgrade will take place on the 23rd inst. I am not to communicate with the minister before the 24th inst. *instead of a day earlier, a day later.*

In the face of this situation, and because according to your instructions by telegram No. 843 of the 20th inst.***) I told the minister in our conversation of yesterday that I was without information on our *démarche* in Belgrade, I ask myself whether I ought not give the information in question to-morrow instead of on the 24th inst.

I must assume that your Excellency has changed your mind—unhappily without informing me of the fact, and that I ought to act according to the instructions of the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3427.

*) Vide No. 22.

**) Vide No. 30.

***) Vide No. 34.

51.

Count Szécsén to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 114.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Referring to the decree of the 20th inst. No. 3428*). I think I ought to mention that from the local point of view here, the coincidence of our *démarche* in Belgrade happening at the same time as the departure of the president from Petersburg, which is fixed for the evening of the 23rd inst. this will be made the subject of much comment and will be regarded in the light of an unfair surprise.

Monsieur Poincaré leaves Kronstadt on the 23rd inst. at ten in the evening, according to the programme, and is to arrive in Stockholm on the 25th inst. at 10 a. m. Telegraphic communication will be difficult during the passage by sea.

52.

Count Szécsén to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 115.

Paris, July 22, 1914.

Private.

Concerning decree of 20th inst. No. 3428**).

I beg an answer by telegram whether when I present a copy of the above decree, I am to request the contents to be treated as private or not.

Some of the demands addressed to Servia are very energetic and will probably be severely judged by this press, so that it might be desirable that the official text should not at once be given to the papers.

If however the text is published in Vienna, there would be no sense in demanding privacy.

Paris papers are already publishing information concerning the contents of the note.

*) Vide No. 30.

**) Vide No. 30.

53.

Visit of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office.

Daily report No. 3487.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

The French ambassador came to the foreign office to-day, to inquire with concern on the present state of our relations with Servia. He discussed all the eventualities which might result from an energetic step on our side towards the cabinet of Belgrade, and painted the dangers resulting from a war between Austria-Hungary and Servia with crude colours, calling attention to the fact, that it might become a war of the slav races against the monarchy.

Notwithstanding this warning, Monsieur Dumaine concluded by saying that from a conversation he had recently had on the subject with his Russian colleague, he had obtained the conviction that Russia did not propose standing up much for Servia in the forthcoming dispute with Austria-Hungary and might only be disposed to give its moral support.

In the eventuality of a war between us and Servia—this is the opinion of the French ambassador—Russia would not take an active part, but would do what it could, to keep the war localised.

54.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 106.

London, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Received courier.

Sir Edward Grey has just asked me by telephone to go and see him at three to-morrow.

It is just possible that he has something to say to me on the subject of our forthcoming step in Belgrade.

Would your Excellency authorise me, eventually to communicate the official decree to-morrow, Thursday afternoon, instead of Friday, asking the Secretary of State to consider it as strictly private until Friday?

I beg for an immediate answer by wire.

55.

Herr Otto to Count Berchtold.

Telegram Nr. 181.

Cettinje, July 22, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Demarche in Belgrade. Decree No. 3435 private, of the 20th inst. *)

I beg for authorisation to leave a copy of the decree with His Majesty the King, if, as is highly probable, he should ask for it.

56.

Herr von Mérey to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 531.

Rome, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

Received your Excellency's telegram of 22nd inst. No. 852 ***) this morning.

I must state first of all:

1. that I did not receive notice in time, for which I begged in my telegram of the 14th inst. No. 512 ***) and which your Excellency promised in your telegram of the 15th inst. No. 820 †), so as to enable me to arrange my visit to the Marquis di San Giuliano at Fuggi by telegram. The instructions did not reach me until to-day, when the *demarche* is being made;

*) Vide No. 31.

**) Vide No. 49.

***) Vide No. 20.

†) Vide No. 22.

2. that an act of courtesy towards Italy is out of question, since contrary to previous arrangement and contrary to the communication made to the German ambassador, the information of our *demarche* in Belgrade cannot be given here a day sooner, but on the same day in the afternoon, as I am instructed.

Another unlucky circumstance is, that my health, which has been bad for some time, has given way altogether and I must keep to my bed to-day.

I must therefore leave the presentation of the decree to Count Ambrósy, who after having telephoned to Marquis di San Giuliano will go to Fuggi by motorcar this afternoon and make the necessary communications to the minister.

57.

Count Berchtold to Count Szécsén in Paris.

Telegram No. 152.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Your Excellency's telegrams of 22nd inst. No. 114 and No. 115 received*).

As to the coincidence of the *demarche* in Belgrad with the departure of Poincaré from Petersburg, it is to be remarked that we always meant to take the *demarche* as soon as the inquiry in Sarajevo had been concluded. This has since been the case.

It would certainly have been much less amiable to interrupt the festivities in Petersburg by acting at an earlier time, and it would not have been in our interest to undertake our step in Belgrade while Emperor Nicholas and the Russian statesmen were under the influence of the two, who are all for war — Poincaré and Iswolsky.

*) Vide No. 51 and 52.

58.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff in London.

Telegram No. 158.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Received your Excellency's telegram of the 22nd inst. No. 106*).

Your Excellency may in to-days conversation with Sir Edward Grey announce the official presentation of the circular note for tomorrow morning and in strict privacy communicate the contents of the note, asking him to keep what you tell him, strictly private.

59.

Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 107.

London, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.

I have just spoken with Sir Edward Grey and told him that I would bring the circular note to-morrow. In the meantime I would tell him something of the contents in confidence. He promised to speak to none of my colleagues, indeed to no one, before the note had been officially received, and did not make any notes during our conversation.

He told me on his part that he had not spoken to me on the subject as yet, because he felt that Austria-Hungary must regard the affair as something between itself and Servia, and also because he did not know what proofs of Servias guilt we had obtained. But he had been spoken to on the subject with apprehension, which is not limited to one group of powers alone. He had answered the questions addressed to him, by saying that all depended upon what proofs we had of Servias guilt and what kind of satisfaction we would demand. If our grievances are well-founded and the reparation we demand, in Servias power, we might hope that Russia would advise moderation. The danger lies in the flaring up of slav excitement in Russian public opinion.

*) Vide No. 54.

Though I informed him on the important points of the note, he declined to speak on the contents of it, until he had it in his hands. (Still he looked as if some of our points of view coincided with his own.) I told him I believed that the answer would have to be given within a fixed term, but that I could not tell him its duration until to-morrow. He said he regretted that a term had been fixed for the answer, because it took away the possibility for excitement to abate and for the powers to influence Belgrade in a conciliatory sense. There would have been time for an ultimatum, when an unsatisfactory answer had been given.

I explained our point of view in detail (the necessity of defending ourselves against incessant subversive undertakings, which threatened the territory of the monarchy, protection of our vital interests, the total failure of our conciliatory attitude in the past, the fact that Serbia has had three weeks' time to set about an inquiry of its own accord, showing that it repudiated the thought of participating in the crime etc.).

He admitted the difficulty of our position, spoke seriously of the gravity of the situation. If four great states, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia and France were to become involved in a war, a state of things must follow, which would be equal to the bankrupt of Europe. No more credit would be available, all industrial centres would be in uproar, so that in most countries, be they victors or defeated, "many a standing institution would be swept away".

I told him that it was my opinion that in this case notwithstanding our well-known love of peace, we would have to remain firm towards Serbia. I told him I trusted his unprejudiced, fair judgment. He declared that a simple remonstrance in Petersburg would not serve in this case. We must be able to prove to Russia that our grievances are well-founded, that a state such as Serbia could well comply with our demands. The best thing he could think of, would be direct exchange of opinions between Vienna and Petersburg. He was as cool and unprejudiced as ever, friendly and not without sympathy for our side. But he is undoubtedly very anxious as to the possible consequences.

I fear that he will have much to say against our *démarche* having the character of an ultimatum and the shortness of the term.

60.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 152.

Petersburg, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.—Private.

My German colleague judges from the identity of the language used by Herr Sazonow before the arrival of Poincaré, with that used by the President, that the latter had had a lesson from Sazonow, who wished in this way to make a greater impression.

This explains that Sazonow is telling everybody that Poincaré found me very much excited against Serbia, whilst I, for reasons that will be easily understood, observed the greatest reserve.

61.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in London, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Petersburg and Constantinople and to the Imp. and Roy. minister in Bucharest.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Address:

1. Count Mensdorff, London, No. 159*),
2. Count Szécsén, Paris, No. 151,
3. Count Szögyény, Berlin, No. 251,
4. Herr von Mérey, Rome, No. 858,
5. Count Szápáry, Petersburg, No. 163,
6. Count Czernin, Sinaia, No. 162,
7. Margrave Pallavicini, Constantinople, No. 203.

*) Compare the text in the Austrian-Hungarian Redbook No. 9.

Ad 1.

Private.

England being that power of the Entente which is most likely to judge our steps in Belgrade in an unprejudiced manner, I will beg you in the conversation to follow the presentation of the circular note on the 24th inst., to remind the Foreign Office that Serbia could have avoided the severity of our serious *demarche*, which it must necessarily have expected, by taking the measures for instituting an inquiry in Serbia against the Servians who took a part in the crime of the 28th June, and to reveal the connections leading from Belgrade to Sarajevo in the affair of the murderous plot.

The Servian government has to this day, though a number of well-known circumstances point to Belgrade, not only undertaken nothing in this direction, but has even attempted to obliterate some of the important indications.

Thus a telegraphic report of our legation in Belgrade shows that the strongly compromised state-official Ciganović, whom the murderers accuse of complicity, was still in Belgrade on the day of the murder, but three days later, when the newspapers began to publish his name, had already left the city. The chief of the Servian press at the same time declared that Ciganović was absolutely unknown in Belgrade.

The short term given to Serbia for its answer must be attributed to our experience of Servias dilatory ways in treating political questions.

We cannot allow the demands, which we have addressed to Serbia, and which contain nothing that would not be considered natural between two neighbours, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises and we owe it to our economical interests, not to consent to political methods, which would allow Serbia to prolong the crisis, in which we find ourselves, at its pleasure.

Ad 2—7.

Private.

I telegraph the following text to Count Mensdorff:

(Follows the text ad 1.)

From "As England" to "at its pleasure."

The above for your information and for the regulation of what you say on the 24th inst.

62.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 80.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

You will take the step arranged for, this afternoon, certainly not at four but at the earliest, a few minutes before five.

If you can possibly arrange matters, postpone the *demarche* to six o'clock, in which case the term of the answer must also be changed to six.

I add for your information that we wish, if it were at all possible, to prevent the news of the *demarche* from reaching Petersburg this evening, because President Poincaré remains there until eleven o'clock to-night.

I beg you to telegraph immediately, whether you must deliver note at five o'clock, or whether you can postpone *demarche* until six o'clock.

63.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 81.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

We learn that Herr Pasić intends tendering his resignation at the moment of the presentation of the note. The resignation of the cabinet would change nothing in our

demands nor in the duration of the term for the answer, since a resigning cabinet always carries on the affairs of state until a new ministry has been named, and is fully responsible.

This is for your information and the direction of your speech with Pasić.

64.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 171.

Belgrade, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered.

Ultimatum.

I will deliver the note to Minister Paču at half past four to-day. My hint, that perhaps Minister Pasić ought to be informed, was rejected as superfluous on the grounds that Minister Paču had yesterday been appointed by decree as representative of the premier and of the minister of Foreign Affairs.

65.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 173.

Belgrade-Semlin, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered.

Ultimatum to Servia.

Note in question presented to Herr Paču at six o'clock this evening.

66.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl in Belgrade.

Telegram No. 83.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.—Private.

Referring to telegrams Nr. 171 and 173 *).

The term *ultimatum*, which you use in your telegrams to designate to-days *Demarche* is not correct, inasmuch that if

*) Vide No. 64 and 65.

the term for the answer expires without result, war does not follow, but only the breaking off of diplomatic relations. The war would commence after it had been formally declared, or Servia had attacked us.

67.

Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Telegram No. 175.

Belgrade, July 23, 1914.

Cypher.

Ultimatum.

Premier *ad interim* Paču after some hesitation conceded a conversation for six o'clock, and received me at the striking of the clock. Secretary-General Gruic was with him, because Paču does not know French.

I gave him the note and added that the term for the answer had been fixed for Saturday at 6 p. m. and that if by that time I had received no answer or an unsatisfactory one, I should leave Belgrade with the entire legation; that at the same time as the answer, I wished to receive the Servian translation of both enunciations, which we were desirous to compare.

Paču, without reading the note, answered that the elections were being carried on and some of the ministers were absent from Belgrade. He feared it would be physically impossible to assemble a complete council of ministers in time for taking, what he must believe to be an important decision.

The council of ministers had been assembled ever since five o'clock. I answered that in our age of railways, telegraphs and telephones and the diminutive size of the country, it could only be a question of a few hours to assemble the ministers, and that in the forenoon I had advised to inform Herr Pasić. But this was an internal Servian concern, that I had no right to judge. Nothing more was discussed.

68.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Schiessl in Ischl.

Telegram.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Most urgent.

I must beg your Excellency to inform His Imp. and Roy. Apostolic Majesty in my name that the Imp. and Roy. minister in Belgrade has presented the note concerning the Servian movement to the Servian Finance-minister Paču, who represents the premier, at six o'clock this afternoon.

The term of 48 hours for the answer therefore expires on Saturday, the 25th inst. at six in the afternoon.

69.

Count Berchtold to Herr Otto in Cetinje.

Telegram No. 133.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

Referring to your telegram of the 22nd inst. No. 131.

You are authorised to give His Majesty the King a copy of the circular note to the powers in strict confidence, if he asks you for it.

At the same time you can tell him that we are glad to assert that the results of the inquiry mentioned in the circular note, does not in any way touch upon Montenegro.

70.

Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Ambassadors in Madrid, to the Vatican, in Washington and in Tokio.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

Adress:

1. Prince Fürstenberg, Madrid, No. 14,
2. Prince Schönburg, Rome, No. 40,
3. Dr. Dumba, Washington, No. 23,
4. Baron Müller, Tokio, No. 22.

1—3.

The Imp. and Roy. minister in Belgrade to-day, Thursday the 23rd inst. presented a note to the royal Servian government in which the latter is called upon to accept a number of demands within fortyeight hours, which we were forced to address to Servia on the grounds of the inquiry instituted after the crime of Sarajevo with a view of putting an end to the plotting in the southern provinces of the monarchy, that has been traced to Servia and in this case more especially to Belgrade.

ad 1.

The above is for your information and for the regulation of your speech with the government to which you are accredited. The decree containing all information on our *Demarche* in Belgrade, as addressed to the Imp. and Roy. representatives at the courts of the Signatory Powers, will reach you by despatch-box.

ad 2.

The above is for your information and for the regulation of your speech and for communication to the Cardinal-State-Secretary. The decree containing all information on our *Demarche* in Belgrade, as sent to the Imp. and Roy-representatives at the courts of the Signatory Powers will reach you by despatch-box.

ad 3.

The above for your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your speech, as also for communication to the State-Secretary.

ad 4.

As the results of the inquiry instituted in Sarajevo have shown that the assassination of the Archduke-heir to the throne was plotted together with Servian officers and government officials, and that this horrible crime is but the result of Servian agitation carried on for years among the population

of our southern frontier provinces, we have been forced to address a number of demands in Belgrade on the 23rd inst. which are intended to stop the subversive movement directed against Austria-Hungary. We have allowed the Servian government a term of 48 hours for complying with our just demands.

I must ask your Excellency to communicate as much to the Imperial government.

Private.

It is possible that the further development of things will lead to a warlike conflict with Servia, eventually with Russia. I am asking your Excellency to keep this in mind and to telegraph to me whether you think it might answer, to call the Tokio governments attention to the fact that here offers a favorable opportunity.

71.

Count Berchtold to the Signatory Embassies, the Balkan Missions and the Imp. and Roy. Minister in Stockholm.

Prot. No. 5136—5147.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

1. Signatory embassies.
2. Balkan missions.
3. Count Hadik, Stockholm.

1—3.

Presentation of our note in Belgrade did not take place until 6 p. m. to-day, Thursday; the term for the answer therefore expires Saturday afternoon at six o'clock.

I beg you to correct the note accordingly.

72.

Count Berchtold to all Imp. and Roy. Missions except the Signatary Embassies, the Balkan Legations, the Embassies in Madrid, Rome (Vatican), Washington, Tokio and the Imp. and Roy. Embassy in Stockholm.

Prot. No. 5108—5129.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Cyphered telegram.

The Imp. and Roy. Minister in Belgrade to-day, Thursday the 23rd inst. presented a note to the Royal Servian government in which the latter is called upon to accept a number of demands within 48 hours, which we have been forced to address to it on the grounds of the results of the Sarajevo inquiry, hoping thereby to put an end at last to the plotting in our southern frontier provinces, the threads of which undeniably lead to Belgrade.

The above is for your information and for the direction of your speech.

73.

Letter from Count Berchtold to the Imp. and Roy. Functionaries in Copenhagen, the Hague, in Brussels, Dresden, Munich, Stuttgart, Berne, Madrid and Lisbon.

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

Address:

Count Széchény, Copenhagen,
Baron Giskra, Hague,
Count Clary, Brussels,
Baron Braun, Dresden,
Herr von Vélies, Munich,
Count Koziebrodzki, Stuttgart,
Baron Gager, Berne,
Baron Gudenus, Madrid,
Baron Kulm, Lisbon.

The propaganda for Greater Servia, which has been busy for a number of years, and whose sole aim was to disjoin from the monarchy its southern frontier provinces, has developed in an alarming manner during the last Balkan wars.

The iniquitous deed of Sarajevo, which has caused horror and indignation all the world over must be regarded as a direct consequence of the agitation spread abroad from Belgrade. The inquiry, which has been instituted, has shown that the crime is not the deed of a single insane individual, but the work of a complicated plot and conspiracy, the origin of which reaches across the frontier to the neighbouring kingdom.

The agitation, which does not shrink from using the most despicable means for effectuating its ends, cannot have been a secret to the leading circles of Belgrade, since it is proved that a great number of well-known functionaries took an active part in it.

The friendly toleration, with which the Servian government regarded this criminal activity, has caused me to address a number of demands to the Servian government, contained in the decree which you receive at the same time as this letter, and which are intended to reestablish normal relations with the neighbouring kingdom.

During latter years the attitude of Servia might repeatedly have given cause to defend our *prestige* with an armed hand. But the monarchy, feeling to be the stronger, and with the sincere wish of maintaining the peace, showed the greatest patience and self-denial. We have found to our misfortune that our love of peace was interpreted in a mistaken way; it created doubts in the strength and unity of the monarchy and increased the conceit of our enemies. By encouraging the belief in the weakness of the monarchy and in the possibility of its dissolution, the Belgrade government and its organs hope to prepare the ground for a favorable moment, when—the Great Powers being perhaps at cross purposes with each other—Servia might succeed in obtaining what it is striving for.

The conservative tendencies of our policy, counsel us to dispel with every means in our power the belief, that the small neighbouring country could at its pleasure conjure up a European war, with a view towards realising its ambitions by disjoining the monarchy. We are therefore convinced that we are doing the interests of Europe a real service, when we

extinguish Servian aspirations by showing a strong hand. if need be, an armed hand, to ensure lasting peace on our southern frontier.

We will not give up hope that the Servian government, by unconditionally accepting our just demands, will lay the foundations for a peaceful development of our reciprocal relations.

I leave it to you to judge, when you have obtained knowledge of the step we are about to take in Belgrade, whether in conversation with the statesmen in your capital you should use the arguments contained in the above.

Accept the assurances etc.

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